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Corporate governance has been practiced for as long as corporate entities have 
existed, yet the academic research of the subject commenced only about 40 years 
ago. The phrase “corporate governance” was rarely used until 1980s, which makes 
it a relatively new discipline, at least compared to the study of management, for 
example. While there was a proliferation of management thought throughout the 
20th century with development of variety of theories, frameworks and models in 
all fields of management (e.g. finance, marketing, operations), aspects of corporate 
governance only attracted attention in the last couple of decades of the century. 
The 21st century, however, promises to be the century of corporate governance as 
our focus shifts to the legitimacy and the effectiveness of corporate entities around 
the world (Tricker, 2018).  
The majority of corporate governance research has been conducted on large 
public companies in large markets, especially in Anglo-American countries, 
leaving other contexts relatively under-explored. However, the findings from the 
afore-mentioned settings are not necessarily applicable to other contexts, as the 
circumstances are different (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Huse, 2007; Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010; Clarke, 2016; Armitage et al., 2017). It is important to note that 
the majority of firms globally fall into the less-covered contexts. The majority of 
firms globally are privately held and in terms of size could be characterized as 
being small or medium sized (SMEs)1. In terms of corporate governance models, 
the Anglo-American model is just one of many. Other parts of world operate 
under different models such as Continental European, or Japanese.  
Furthermore, previous research has predominantly taken an agency-theoretical 
view (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and focused on keeping management account-
able, i.e. it has dealt mostly with compliance, minimizing downside risks for firms 
and maximizing shareholder value. However, as agency theory has been criticized 
for being too narrow or simplistic in its assumptions (Roberts et al., 2005; Kumar 
& Zattoni, 2019), other theoretical paradigms have gained more prominence in 
corporate governance research. These alternative theories include, for instance, 
stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997), resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), upper echelons theory (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and insti-
tutional theory (North, 1990). It is often useful to apply several theories simul-
taneously in corporate governance research, given the complex nature of the 
phenomenon (Li et al., 2020). Such expansion in theoretical underpinnings has 
turned our attention also to other aspects of corporate governance that had been 
                                                                          
1  The thesis applies European Commission’s definition for SMEs, i.e. a firm must meet two 
criteria to be considered an SME: 1) the headcount of a firm should be less than 250, and 2) 
either the turnover should not exceed EUR 50 million, or the total balance sheet should not 
exceed EUR 43 million (European Commission). It should also be noted that the SME 
definition used in this thesis includes micro-firms. 90% of firms in European Union are small 
and medium-sized (European Commission, 2021). 
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neglected in the narrow agency-theoretic debate. For example, in addition to 
minimizing downside risks for the firm, the focus is also on how corporate gover-
nance can help firms unlock upside potential and perform better (e.g. Uhlaner et 
al, 2007; Huse et al., 2011; Aguilera et al., 2016).  
Also, following the wider economic and societal transformations (Filatotchev 
et al., 2020), views on corporate purpose have started to shift away from a purely 
shareholder focus (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) to incorporating more stake-
holder and corporate social responsibility (CSR) views into the equation (e.g. 
Freeman, 1984; Brink, 2010; García-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Barney, 2018). 
Based on that emerging logic, there are various stakeholder groups such as owners 
(or investors), employees, suppliers, customers, communities, governments, social 
and environmental activists, to name a few (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Mason 
& Simmons, 2014) that participate in a firm’s value creation, and therefore should 
participate also in the value distribution of the firm (García-Castro & Aguilera, 
2015; Aguilera et al., 2016). There is no finite list of stakeholders. Furthermore, 
the relevance of each stakeholder group to each particular firm depends on the 
context. Certain stakeholder groups might be relevant for some firms and not for 
others. For example, Mitchell et al. (1997) put forward a framework that helps 
management to identify important stakeholders based on three factors: 1) whether 
they have some sort of power over the focal firm (i.e. they can influence the firm), 
2) whether their claims on the firm in question have legitimacy (e.g. based on 
contracts or on moral grounds), and 3) the level of urgency of stakeholders’ claim 
(i.e. criticality and time-sensitivity of the claim). Also, the relevance of stake-
holder groups to a particular firm may change over time. Relevant stakeholder 
groups depend on each other in the value creation of the firm but have different 
and potentially conflicting goals. So, when accepting that the purpose of the firm 
is to serve all these relevant stakeholder groups, the question for corporate gover-
nance transforms from how to assure the financial return for owners solely, a 
narrow definition of performance, into how to find a balance in satisfying the needs 
of all relevant stakeholders, a broader definition of performance (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Harrison et al., 2020). A remarkable illustration for this shift in thinking is 
the redefinition of corporate purpose in stakeholder terms by the Business 
Roundtable, an association of chief executive officers of leading companies in 
the U.S. (Harrison et al., 2020). These leading firms now “commit to lead their 
companies for the benefit of all stakeholders – customers, employees, suppliers, 
communities and shareholders” (Business Roundtable, 2019).  
In summary, corporate governance research has historically been relatively 
one-sided in its focus on keeping the management of large Anglo-American 
public firms accountable to shareholders. Over time there has been an expansion 
of the study of other contexts and a wider and more varied usage of theoretical 
paradigms. However, more work is still being called for by several authors (e.g. 
Uhlaner et al., 2007; Brunninge et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2014, Neckebrouck et al., 
2019). The thesis is motivated by these calls and answers them by focusing its 
research specifically on corporate governance in the under-explored context of 
private SMEs. The thesis applies a multi-theory approach, i.e. the literature 
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review as well as empirical analyses do not constrain the discussion with one 
specific theoretical paradigm, but instead draw insights from various theories to 
explain a complex phenomenon from several perspectives. Furthermore, the 
research is conducted in the context of the less well covered Continental European 
governance model and specifically examines Estonian firms. Relevant corporate 
governance characteristics applicable to Estonia as well as the rationale for 
choosing Estonia for the study setting are explained in the section “Study setting”. 
 
Research objectives and tasks 
The objective of the thesis is to extend our understanding on how corporate 
governance of private SMEs is associated with performance. 
 
The following research tasks have been set for the thesis: 
 
1. Build conceptual framework for studying corporate governance and its relation 
to firm performance on a general level (Section 1.1). 
2. Discuss the specific aspects of governance in the contexts of firms being private 
SMEs (Section 1.2). 
3. Discuss various domains of firm performance (Section 1.3) 
4. Identify and discuss gaps in the academic literature regarding links between 
private SME governance and performance (Section 1.4, empirical studies). 
5. Outline research questions to be answered in the thesis based on literature 
review and research gaps (Section 1.4). 
6. Perform and present empirical studies to answer the research questions (Studies 
1–3). 
7. Discuss and summarize the answers to research questions together with their 




The thesis is based on three empirical studies (Studies 1–3) that explore private 
SME governance and links to performance from several angles. The research has 
been designed to be balanced from various perspectives2, including methodologi-
cally as qualitative and quantitative methods have been combined across studies. 
Study 1 applies qualitative inquiry in the form of a case study. The possibility of 
going deeper into the phenomenon with how and why questions is what makes a 
case study method useful for discussion and explanation of the phenomenon in 
its entirety. The author of the thesis believes that providing such general and all-
encompassing discussion in the first empirical Study creates a sound basis for 
                                                                          
2  See chapter “Novelties” for more details on that aspect. 
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understanding the “big picture” of private SME governance, the key elements of 
the phenomenon as well as links between the elements. Studies 2 and 3 build on 
the “big picture” and go deeper with analysing quantitatively certain key elements 
of private SME governance and their links to different types of firm performance. 
The reason for such methodological variety was to uncover more nuances in the 
phenomenon and thus extend our understanding of it in a more holistic manner. 
The following paragraphs and Table 1 summarise briefly the main aims, 
methodological approach and data for each Study. 
Study 1 of the thesis has two main aims. First, it discusses connections between 
a firm’s broader and narrower performance, i.e. how the stakeholder perspective 
(represented as CSR performance) is important also for the financial performance 
of the firm. Secondly, it analyses how the top decision makers of the firm achieve 
the goals of shareholders as well as other stakeholders via developing appropriate 
corporate governance bundles3. Using the case study approach, the paper focuses 
on a leading private equity firm (BaltCap) which is active in Estonia. Private 
equity funds are professional investors, whose business model includes investing 
into firms, developing them and increasing their value by (among other aspects) 
improvements in their corporate governance practices, and exiting the firms after 
some years (hopefully) at a significantly higher value. Their experience is deemed 
invaluable in understanding how to design appropriate corporate governance 
bundles that support both financial and CSR performance of private firms.  
The case study method applied in Study 1 enables us to get deeper insights 
into the why and how questions on the interconnectivity of CSR, long-term finan-
cial performance and corporate governance. The paper applies the critical case 
approach, which enables the author to generalize that the corporate governance 
bundle created by professional private SME owners (private equity fund BaltCap) 
with the purpose of achieving both CSR and financial performance, is also appli-
cable to other private SME owners with similar aims (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In order 
to establish theoretical generalizability we applied the following methodological 
principles (Andrade, 2009): decided on our unit of analysis (portfolio company), 
conducted theoretical sampling (the informant having enough knowledge and 
experience), established chain of evidence (both between primary and secondary 
sources as well as between interviews), conducted thematic text analysis and 
categorization until reaching theoretical sufficiency. Study 1 is based on various 
primary and secondary data. Secondary data included BaltCap’s annual reports, 
CSR code, Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) reports for years 2011–
2018 and an overview of its investee companies. Primary data was collected 
through five semi-structured in-depth interviews plus a follow-up interview to 
get more details on any outstanding issues. The first three interviews were with 
BaltCap’s representatives. The interviews were transcribed and thematically 
                                                                          
3  “Corporate governance bundle” – a key term in this thesis – is a more wide-spread and 
convenient term used instead of the term “bundle of governance mechanisms”. Corporate 
governance bundle deals with the operational side of corporate governance, i.e. how to apply 
the principles of corporate governance in practice. See further elaboration in literature review. 
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analysed. The information received from these interviews was validated by two 
interviews with their portfolio companies.  
Study 2 applies logistic regression to analyse interconnections between the 
corporate governance and financial performance of private SMEs. The study 
measures financial performance (dependent variable) based on the Altman Score 
(failure prediction model number 2 in Altman et al. (2017), page 154), which is 
an aggregate measure consisting of a firm’s liquidity, profitability and leverage 
data, and as such, gives a multidimensional view on a firm’s financial performance. 
The study by Altman et al. (2017) covered millions of European firms, including 
firms from Estonia, and has high classification accuracy in Estonia. Independent 
variables included seven corporate governance characteristics: board size, board 
gender heterogeneity, board tenure, age of top managers, multiple directorships, 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership. The analysis was based on 
67,058 Estonian SMEs and the data both for dependent as well as independent 
variables were procured from the Estonian Business Register, which contains 
firms’ annual reports and up-to-date data regarding firms’ owners and boards.  
While Study 2 takes a static look on the relationship between corporate gover-
nance and firm performance, Study 3 takes a dynamic view. Specifically, the 
study analyses linkages between the appointment of a new management board 
member (arguably one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms) 
and subsequent various types of strategic changes in the firm’s product-market 
scope. In essence, the Study explores linkages between the change in the gover-
nance bundle and change in subsequent business performance. 
The study applies logistic regression analysis to find associations between the 
appointment of a new management board member (independent variable), which 
is one of the most critical governance bundle mechanisms, and different types of 
subsequent strategic changes (dependent variables): a firm starting to export, an 
already exporting firm expanding to new export markets and a firm diversifying 
into new industries. Furthermore, for each of the strategic change types addi-
tionally scale and stability dimensions were analysed, so in total 3 models for 
each type (general, with scale criterion and with stability criterion). Consequently 
9 binary logistic regression models were built (3 strategic change types times 3 
models for each). Additionally, 3 ordered logistic models were built with the 
same independent variable and general strategic change (i.e. any of the strategic 
change types) as dependent variable. The study is based on the population of 
Estonian firms that met certain criteria. The total dataset consisted of 16,941 
SMEs. Data for the models were retrieved from Estonian Business Register. The 
analysis accounts for all episodes of a new board member being nominated in the 
year 2013 and follows whether or not any of the strategic change types occurred 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estonia as a study setting 
The empirical studies within the thesis are based on companies operating in the 
Continental European governance system, more specifically in Estonia. Being 
explicit about that fact is important as corporate governance is influenced by 
circumstances in each country or region. For example, Anglo-American countries, 
which constitute the dominant and most covered study setting for corporate 
governance research, are characterized by dispersed ownership, strong property 
rights, well developed financial markets, a rich information flow and relatively 
efficient formal and informal institutions, such as courts or professional norms 
(Roe, 2004; Kumar & Zattoni, 2019), which is not always the case in other 
countries. In contrast, the Continental European corporate governance system is 
characterized by weak shareholder rights, a reliance on long-term bank financing 
rather than raising funds from public markets, inactive markets for corporate 
control, rigid labour markets and concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Yoshikawa et al., 2014; Armitage et al., 2017). Thus, 
it is important to summarise key facts about the corporate governance model of 
the country or region where the firms to be analysed are situated. 
The following paragraphs first introduce Estonia as the institutional setting for 
corporate governance research by summarizing the key aspects of the formal as 
well as informal side of the Estonian corporate governance system, and secondly 
provide a rationale for conducting the empirical research of the thesis specifically 
in Estonia. 
Estonia has been a member of the European Union since 2004 and the euro-
zone since 2011. This means, that the formal governance institutions, such as legis-
lation and judicial system are harmonized with general European frameworks. 
The Estonian Commercial Code (2020) permits several legal types of firms. The 
two main ones are Private Limited Company (in Estonian “Osaühing”; hereafter 
referred to as PrLC) and Public Limited Company4 (in Estonian “Aktsiaselts”; 
hereafter referred to as PuLC). Other types are relatively rare in practice. In terms 
of corporate governance, PrLCs have a simple structure of one-tier board (the 
management board), which is responsible for the daily management of the firm 
and which is subject to owners of the firm. It is possible also to set up the super-
visory board for PrLCs, adopting the two-tier board system, but that is voluntary 
and rare. PuLCs have two-tier boards with a clear separation of supervisory and 
management boards. The management board manages the firm and reports to the 
supervisory board and not directly to owners of the firm. The supervisory board 
plans the activities of the firm, organises the management of the firm and super-
vises the activities of the management board. The supervisory board is responsible 
for selecting and removing management board members. The members of one of 
the boards may not be members of the other board, i.e. in Estonia there is no 
                                                                          
4  The English translation of Aktsiaselts to Public Limited Company is somewhat unfortunate 
and could be slightly confusing as Aktsiaselts is not public in the sense of being traded on a 
stock exchange.  
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Chairman-CEO duality problem, which is a typical debate topic in the Anglo-
American system. Supervisory board members are elected and removed by the 
General Meeting of shareholders, which is the highest managing body of a PuLC. 
In practice, most firms use the simplified PrLC structure. 
The majority of firms in Estonia are private with only 16 firms listed on 
Tallinn Stock Exchange main list (as at February 2021). The majority of firms 
are also SMEs. According to Statistics Estonia (2020) there were 137 980 firms 
in Estonia in 2020. Out of these, only 172 firms had more than 250 employees 
(a threshold after which a firm is no longer considered an SME by the European 
Commission). Estonian firm ownership landscape is characterized by family-
ownership and also domestic as well as foreign outside owners.  
In terms of informal governance institutions such as business culture, norms 
and values Estonia could still be considered a country in transition (Vadi, 2018). 
Such aspects take significantly longer to change and should be considered as an 
important contextual factor. 
Estonia regained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and the early 
1990s was marked by a period of privatization of firms. By 1995 the period of 
privatization was predominantly over and the initial legislative framework 
regarding corporate operations had started to develop (Alas & Elenurm, 2014; 
Kooskora, 2015). The Estonian Commercial Code is largely based on the German 
version of Continental European corporate governance model (Alas & Elenurm, 
2014). During these early years of capitalism, owners lacked corporate governance 
experience and long-term strategic vision (Alas & Elenurm, 2014). The main 
business purpose was quick profitmaking and activities focused on short-term 
interests i.e. no more than 1–3 years ahead. A new millennium ushered in longer-
term perspectives, from 5 to 10 years (Kooskora, 2008, 2015). The Soviet occu-
pation had left a significant legacy on morality and attitudes, so during the initial 
years of re-independence, business ethics and corporate social responsibility 
issues were new to firm owners and managers. These aspects were seen as rather 
irrelevant while firms struggled to survive and focused primarily on financial 
performance. In more recent years, attitudes have changed as more and more 
business leaders have a broader perspective on performance and also consider the 
ethical, social and environmental aspects of business (Kooskora, 2015). 
Thus, in general, the informal side of external governance institutions has expe-
rienced rapid development over the past 30 years. This development continues 
but the background of the key actors of corporate governance (owners, supervisory 
and management board members) should be considered when discussing corpo-
rate governance in Estonia. 
There are several reasons why studying private SME governance is especially 
fruitful in Estonia. First, almost all firms in Estonia are private SMEs as high-
lighted in the previous section. Out of 137 980 firms only 16 are publicly listed 
and only 172 could be considered to be large.  
Second, financial as well as corporate governance data of all firms in Estonia 
are publicly available through official state databases (e.g. the Estonian Business 
Register). Gathering data with similar scope, depth and accuracy is much more 
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difficult in most other countries. Such data availability enables research on a 
population rather than sample level. Furthermore, the data gathered from these 
official databases is factual, not self-reported, which eliminates another typical 
limitation from corporate governance research.  
Third, as discussed previously, Estonia uses a Continental European corporate 
governance system. As corporate governance research typically assumes by default 
Anglo-American settings, it is important to balance the research base by bringing 
attention to other, less covered settings. 
Fourth, from local Estonian perspective there have been signs of stagnation 
and lack of new ideas in the Estonian economy as shown by several recent studies 
regarding management practices mandated by Enterprise Estonia (Eesti juhtimis-
valdkonna uuring, 2011; 2015). Both studies concluded with several points of 
criticism towards Estonian owners and managers, for example lack of ambition, 
lack of cooperation between owners and managers, unwarranted satisfaction with 
the status quo and many others, i.e. topics relevant to corporate governance. It 
seems that there is a lack of awareness about how corporate governance might be 
used to push Estonian firms to the next level, which calls for more systematic study 
and discussion of the topic, specifically in the context applicable to Estonian 
firms. 
 
Novelty of the research 
The thesis complements existing academic literature in several novel aspects.  
First, the thesis takes a holistic and balanced look at the connections between 
corporate governance and firm performance. This is done by discussing the design 
of a corporate governance bundle (Study 1) and its association with performance 
in both static (Study 2) and dynamic (Study 3) perspectives. Also, firm perfor-
mance is explored in its various domains: financial performance (Study 1 and 2), 
business performance (Study 3) and organizational effectiveness (Study 1). 
Furthermore, the thesis applies different research methods to shed light on more 
nuances. The thesis builds upon several influential theories used in corporate 
governance research instead of limiting itself to any one particular theory. This 
approach enables to reveal more nuances and avoid over-simplification. The above 
aspects support each other in expanding our understanding of corporate gover-
nance and its complexities. 
Second, the thesis focuses specifically on private SMEs, an underexplored 
area within the corporate governance domain. Previous corporate governance 
literature is dominated by research on large public firms while the private firm 
context is relatively less covered (Uhlaner et al., 2007, Li et al., 2020). This gap 
is unfortunate given that the majority of firms globally are private (La Porta et al., 
1999; Aminadav & Papaioannou, 2020). There are significant distinctions between 
the two groups, which means that issues to be dealt with by corporate governance 
are not the same, and studies performed in the large public firm context might not 
be relevant for smaller private firms.  
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Third, the thesis presents and discusses a specific corporate governance bundle 
designed by professional private firm owners (private equity fund BaltCap) to 
enhance the performance of its investee firms: private SMEs. It also presents a 
roadmap for owners of private SMEs regarding how to go about creating an 
effective corporate governance bundle for their firms. Such models provide 
practical templates for private SME owners and are also crucial additions to the 
academic literature for further discussions on how to govern small private firms 
(Li et al., 2020). 
Fourth, the thesis focuses on governing firms in the under-explored Conti-
nental European (specifically Estonian) institutional setting. Corporate gover-
nance literature tends to assume the Anglo-American setting and neglect other 
institutional contexts. However, the external context has an impact on various 
governance practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Schiehll et al., 2014; Aminadav 
& Papaioannou, 2020) and therefore studies in different settings are needed.  
Fifth, the empirical analyses (Studies 2 and 3) are based on the population of 
all SMEs in Estonia using data from the official business register, which means 
that the study is free from any sampling bias or self-reporting bias: typical limi-
tations in similar research. Basing analyses on such official and all-inclusive data 
increases the validity of conclusions. 
Sixth, the thesis adds to the academic discussion on the interface between 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. This domain is 
relatively fragmented (Jain & Jamali, 2016) and some contexts, such as private 
SMEs and smaller markets (such as Estonia) are relatively underexplored (Estapé-
Dubreuil et al., 2016; Jamali et al., 2017; Amos, 2018; López-Pérez et al., 2018).  
Seventh, Study 2 in the thesis is one of the few studies about association 
between corporate governance variables and failure risk within the private 
SME space. Although associations between corporate governance data and failure 
risk have been used in the large public firm setting, private SME context has been 
relatively silent about it, with only a few studies available, e.g. Ciampi (2015; 
2017). The gap in literature is important as majority of firms globally are private 
SMEs and it has been shown that models developed for large public firms are not 
appropriate for private SME context (e.g. Altman & Sabato, 2007; Elshahat et al., 
2015). Furthermore, the link between corporate governance and failure has 
typically been studied based on a narrow subset of failure, i.e. bankruptcy or 
permanent insolvency, the Study 2 uses failure risk as dependent variable. Such 
broader indicator includes all important financial domains like liquidity, 
profitability and leverage, and enables to provide analysis in much wider scope.  
Eighth, Study 3 focuses on the underexplored dynamic perspective (Boeker, 
1997; Elosge et al., 2018) on associations between change in corporate governance 
bundle, namely nomination of a new management board member, and business 
performance, represented as internationalization and diversification outcomes of 
private SMEs. Other studies in the field typically take a static view focusing on 
specific corporate governance characteristics, e.g. board size, heterogeneity and 
other typical board characteristics. Furthermore, it takes a more holistic approach 
compared to previous research by applying the same dataset for exploring 
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strategic change in both internationalization as well as industry diversification 
dimensions. Such an approach allows for comparisons on the strengths of asso-
ciations between nomination of new management board member and subsequent 
strategic changes in these separate growth dimensions. Previous studies typically 
have focused on either one dimension or the other. Also, the Study explicitly 
analyses the scale and stability of these strategic changes, aspects that are typi-
cally overlooked in other studies. 
 
Contribution of individual authors 
All Studies included in the thesis are co-authored, the author of the thesis being 
the first author of all Studies. Study 1 is written jointly with Krista Jaakson, PhD, 
from Tartu University while Studies 2 and 3 with Oliver Lukason, PhD, from 
Tartu University. The contribution of individual authors was as follows. 
 
Study 1 
The research objective, research questions as well as research design were dis-
cussed and agreed upon together by both authors. The author of the thesis put 
together the draft of interview questions, the co-author suggested additions and 
improvements in the questionnaires. Both authors performed secondary data 
analysis independently and the findings were discussed jointly. Both authors 
participated in the interviews. All findings were discussed jointly and both authors 
contributed to the writing of the manuscript. 
 
Study 2 and Study 3 
The co-operation style and role divisions were similar in case of Studies 2 and 3. 
Research objective and research design were discussed and agreed on by both 
authors. The author of the thesis developed specific research questions and 
performed the literature review while the co-author was responsible for empirical 
data collection. Both authors were involved in regression modelling, presenting 
and interpreting the empirical results. The author of the thesis was responsible 
for the discussion of the results in the light of previous literature.
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The literature review is structured as follows (see Figure 1). Section 1.1. gives a 
conceptual overview of corporate governance. It discusses the key elements of 
corporate governance as well as shows how these elements are interconnected. 
This is done in order to provide a general understanding of the field. Section 1.2. 
builds on the conceptual overview and focuses specifically on the specific 
characteristics of corporate governance in private SME context. Section 1.3. 
presents the multifaceted field of firm performance. The literature review ends 
with a specification of research questions for the thesis in section 1.4.  
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of literature review. 
 
 
1.1. Conceptual framework of corporate governance  
Corporate governance is defined as “a system by which companies are directed 
and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992). The functional parts that perform the direction 
and controlling tasks within that system are called governance mechanisms 
(Ward et al., 2009) which allocate authority, roles and responsibilities among 
owners, supervisory board and top management, i.e. the key decision makers of 
firms (Roe, 2004). In other words, governance mechanisms influence the actions 
of and interactions between the key decision makers of the firm, which in turn 
impacts firm performance, as posited by upper echelons theory (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007).  
Governance mechanisms are further divided into external and internal 
governance mechanisms (Walsh & Seward, 1990). External mechanisms – also 
referred to as institutions by institutional theorists (North, 1990) – are mecha-
nisms that impact firms from outside and thus are not under the firms’ control 
(see Table 2 for a few examples of external mechanisms). External mechanisms 
are location-specific and include socially constructed assumptions, values, 
beliefs, as well as formal and informal rules (Aguilera et al., 2018), which set the 
Conceptual overview of 
corporate governance 
(section 1.1) 







legitimate “rules of the game” (Aguilera et al., 2015). Examples of such external 
mechanisms would be legislation, local culture, commonly agreed principles of 
doing business, and many others. These external mechanisms significantly impact 
the governance of firms. They help ensure managers respect the rights and interests 
of firm’s stakeholders, engage stakeholders with the firm, provide financial trans-
parency, offer strategic guidance (Aguilera et al., 2015) and therefore provide 
stability and meaning (Judge et al., 2008). External mechanisms also impact the 
selection and design of internal governance mechanisms by, for example, making 
some potential internal governance mechanisms unavailable or unreasonably 
expensive (Doidge et al., 2007). 
External mechanisms vary from place to place around the world and are typi-
cally researched on a national basis (e.g. Aslan & Kumar, 2014; Millar, 2014; 
Schiell et al., 2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014; Hooghiemstra et al., 2015). Given 
this diversity around the world and influence on governance choices, these external 
mechanisms are treated as contingency factors in corporate governance research 
and are one of the reasons for doing research in different locations: findings from 
one location might not be applicable, or even possible, in some other location. It 
is therefore essential to study the corporate governance of a firm while keeping 
in mind the institutional context in which it operates (Judge et al., 2008). 
 
Table 2. Examples of external governance mechanisms.  
External mechanism Impact on corporate governance 
Legal system Laws and regulations set the “rules of the game” for a firm 
in its jurisdiction: what is and what is not allowed. Law 
enforcement institutions (e.g. courts) oversee adherence to 
the rules. Limits managerial opportunism; reduces 
environmental uncertainty; creates capacity to obtain 
resources. 
External auditing Reduces information asymmetry by providing assurance on 
the quality of financial statements; limits managerial 
opportunism; signals legitimacy. 
Media Potential reputation loss keeps managers in line; social 
control; reduces information asymmetry. 
Source: Created by author, based on Aguilera at al. (2015). 
 
Internal, or organization-based mechanisms are mechanisms that organizations 
can impose upon themselves in order to address a variety of governance issues 
related to both avoidance of negative outcomes (or downside risks) and support 
of positive outcomes (or upside potential). Internal mechanisms are not given 
from any outside constituency or institution, but organizations can choose and 
design their own mechanisms. Some examples of internal mechanisms are dis-
cussed below and presented in Table 3.  
A classic example of dealing with downside risks is the handling of potential 
agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) emanating from the separation of 
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ownership and management (Berle & Means, 1932). When owners delegate the 
operation of a firm to managers, they forfeit direct control over the firm. The 
performance of the firm (and therefore return on investment for the owners) 
depends on the decisions and efforts taken by the managers, but these are not 
fully observable to owners. Owners only see the outcome of managerial actions, 
but not the efforts behind it. Such information asymmetry creates prospects for 
opportunistic behaviour for managers such as shirking or indulging in excessive 
perquisites (Ward, 2009). In order to remedy the situation, the owners might try 
to align the interests of managers to those of shareholders via certain governance 
mechanisms, for example an appropriate compensation system, or making in-
appropriate behaviour more difficult via effective control systems or the moni-
toring function of the supervisory board.  
Regarding the achievement of upside potential, one of the key governance 
problems is to make sure that the management of the firm possesses the necessary 
competences and resources required for the desired performance (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). Therefore, forming a management team with 
appropriate characteristics for that particular firm is a crucial governance mecha-
nism. Furthermore, managerial characteristics are not only related to the compe-
tences and experiences of the managers, but also their values and attitudes. Owners 
should prefer managers that are stewards (Davis et al., 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 
1998) of the firm rather than self-serving agents as discussed previously. In this 
case, the need for control is lessened and governance mechanisms such as manage-
rial empowerment through trust, collaboration, service and positive reinforce-
ment (Gabrielsson, 2007; Knapp et al., 2011; Hernandez, 2012) are called for. In 
addition, as circumstances (e.g. firm goals) change, the owners can make modi-
fications to the management team in order to, for example, bring in new compe-
tence or experience suitable or required for the new situation.  
The management team could be further supported by the supervisory board in 
their service and strategy roles (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). For example, supervisory 
boards could be a mechanism to form stronger links to the firm’s environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and acquire essential resources required for sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). These resources could be, for example, 
specific industry or functional knowledge (e.g. Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & 
March, 1988) or connections to important stakeholders (e.g. Haynes & Hillman, 
2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In this role the supervisory board reduces 
external uncertainty and reduces transaction costs related to environmental inter-
dependencies (Williamson, 1981). In general, supervisory boards can be a source 
for strengthening a firm’s human and social capital base (Haynes & Hillman, 





Table 3. Examples of internal governance mechanisms.  
Internal mechanism Impact on corporate governance 
Managerial incentive 
system 
Alignment of interests of owners and managers and thereby 
reduction in agency conflict. 
Management turnover Threat of management turnover could serve as a control 
mechanism for managerial opportunism; actual 
management turnover could acquire necessary human or 
social capital for the firm. 
Supervisory board 
control role 
Limits managerial opportunism. 
Supervisory board 
advisory role 
Provision of specific knowledge and expertise (e.g. industry 
or business function related), support in strategy 
development. 
Supervisory board 
resource provision role 




characteristics (e.g. age, 
experience, board size, 
gender heterogeneity) 
The characteristics of individual supervisory or 
management board members, as well as collective 
characteristics of respective boards illustrate for example 
human and social capital available at the top of the firm, 
which either limits or enables certain activities and 
performance outcomes. 
Source: Created by author. 
 
There is no comprehensive list of possible governance mechanisms as it is possible 
to define the boundaries of various mechanisms differently. For example, the 
supervisory board could be regarded as a governance mechanism (see e.g. Roe, 
2004). But the mechanism could also be viewed in a more granular way, such as 
separating supervisory board’s control and advisory functions (e.g. Uhlaner et al., 
2007), or by looking at the composition of supervisory board by a variety of 
characteristics, e.g. size, heterogeneity, experience (e.g. Chaganti et al., 1985; 
Dowell et al., 2011). There is certain flexibility in the usage of terminology of 
corporate governance literature as it has evolved over time and across disciplines 
(Ocasio & Joseph, 2005), which a reader of the literature needs to account for. 
Each firm, thus, is governed by a certain number of external and internal gover-
nance mechanisms, which collectively are called a “bundle of governance mecha-
nisms” (Rediker & Seth, 1995), or more conveniently a corporate governance 
bundle (Aguilera et al., 2008). Thus, to reiterate, while corporate governance is 
the system for directing and controlling firms, a corporate governance bundle is 
a collection of mechanisms that perform the directing and controlling, i.e. the 
bundle may be considered as the practical or operationalized perspective of 
corporate governance. The bundle may be disaggregated into external, or national 
governance bundle, which is location-specific, and given to the firm operating in 
that location, and internal governance bundle, which is firm specific. It is widely 
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accepted that firm performance depends on the combined effect of all mechanisms 
applied, rather than any single mechanism. Therefore, governance mechanisms 
should not be viewed separately but cumulatively, i.e. in bundles (Rediker & 
Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2009; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; 
Filatotchev & Wright, 2017). The reason for such bundling approach is that all 
mechanisms are linked together by complementarity and substitutability rela-
tionships. Complementarity means that the addition of a mechanism to an existing 
bundle interacts with the effect of other mechanisms in the bundle, and thus the 
overall effectiveness of the bundle changes. For example, in some contexts the 
supervisory board’s monitoring role might not be sufficient in curbing managerial 
opportunism, but it could be complemented with a pay system that aligns the 
CEO’s and shareholders’ interests (Ward, 2009). Substitutability means that some 
governance mechanisms perform essentially the same function, and therefore can 
be substituted for each other without significantly affecting the overall func-
tionality of the bundle. For example, monitoring by the supervisory board could 
be substituted by monitoring by a large shareholder (Rediker & Seth, 1995). 
Given these complementarity and substitutability effects, it is possible to design 
very different governance bundles by including or excluding certain internal gover-
nance mechanisms.  
There are a few factors potentially impacting the choice of internal mechanisms. 
First, external and internal contingencies, or the context in which the focal 
organization operates, play a role in designing internal governance bundles. Exter-
nal contingencies are the external governance mechanisms discussed earlier, i.e. 
factors such as legislation, culture and norms, which form the environment in 
which the firm operates. Internal contingencies are firm-specific factors such as 
firm size, its resources and capabilities and life cycle phase (Huse, 2005; Aguilera 
et al., 2008; Filatotchev & Allcock, 2010). Thus, contingencies imply that corpo-
rate governance mechanisms to be added to a firm’s governance bundle are influ-
enced by these factors. Different types of organizations require different corporate 
governance mechanisms: there is no “best practice” that will fit everybody 
(Heracleous, 2001; Huse, 2005; García-Castro et al., 2013).  
Secondly, each mechanism comes with a cost. Some costs are direct such as 
remuneration of supervisory and management board members, costs of risk man-
agement systems and auditor fees while some are indirect, or opportunity costs, 
such as managerial time spent on investor relations instead of strategic or operating 
activities (Aguilera et al. 2008). Thus, while in principle, a firm could add many 
governance mechanisms into a bundle to maximize the complementarity effect, 
the cost of all of these could outweigh the benefits and the impact on firm per-
formance could be negative (García-Castro et al., 2013). The application of each 






1.2. Specific features of governance of private SMEs  
Research on private SME governance includes two types of contingency factors 
that both impact corporate governance bundles. First, the firms in focus are 
private, i.e. they are not publicly listed on any stock exchange. Second, the firms 
are small or medium-sized, i.e. large firms are excluded from this group. In the 




Private versus public firms 
While private firms as a group are quite heterogeneous, there are still several 
recurring specific characteristics that have implications on corporate governance. 
The shares of private firms are not publicly traded, which means that the 
ownership structure as well as owners’ roles and expectations tend to be signifi-
cantly different from publicly traded firms. Private firm owners are more con-
nected to their firms. Their wealth is tied to the wellbeing of their firms (Ciampi, 
2015), as opposed to public firms which typically have small shareholders with 
diversified portfolios. Public firm shareholders typically own very small fractions 
of the firm and thus have little or no incentives to monitor managers or seek to 
influence managerial decisions (Denis & McConnell, 2003). It is easier for them 
to sell their shares and invest somewhere else, when they are not happy with the 
actions taken or results achieved by the firm’s management (Connelly et al., 
2010). For private firm owners the selling of their firms is much more difficult, 
which means they are more interested in the performance of the particular firm 
and the role of owners becomes more relevant in the corporate governance.  
It is also important to note that private firms tend to have concentrated owner-
ship (La Porta, 1999), which means the power relationship vis-à-vis the manage-
ment is different. It is much easier for concentrated owners to make changes in 
the management compared to dispersed shareholders of public firms. So, instead 
of selling their firm, the owners might make changes in the management to put 
the firm back on their preferred track. Private firm owners, tend to have a longer 
time perspective and broader success criteria than just financial results, as opposed 
to public firms where shareholders pressure managers for short-term results in 
quarterly reports (Huse, 2005). 
In addition, the separation of ownership and management is not that clear-cut 
for private firms, i.e. the ownership and management tend to overlap (Huse, 2005; 
Brunninge et al., 2007). This means there is less information asymmetry between 
managers and owners and therefore fewer opportunities for managerial oppor-
tunism. In other words, the agency problem as discussed in the agency theory is 
relatively less important compared to public firms (Uhlaner et al., 2007; Machold 
et al., 2011). Instead of such agency issues between owners and managers, a 
potential conflict between controlling owner(s) and minority owner(s) becomes 
more relevant. Majority owners might, for example, engage in value tunnelling 
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at the expense of minority owners (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Roe, 2004), so the 
corporate governance bundle should deal with that issue. 
 
 
SMEs versus large firms 
SMEs tend to have less resources than large firms, which means that they cannot 
afford large management boards. However, since the management is responsible 
for formulating and executing the strategic decisions of the firm, it is critical that 
the management board, however small, has the right qualifications to support the 
fulfilment of the goals of that particular firm (Cowling, 2003). This means for the 
owners and supervisory board of SMEs that selection, motivation and potentially 
replacement of the CEO and other management team members are key gover-
nance mechanisms. Given that small firms tend to have concentrated ownerships, 
it is relatively easy (at least compared to large public firms) for the owners to make 
changes in the management board.  
Another critical governance mechanism for SMEs is the supervisory board, 
especially in its resource provision role (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Machold 
et al., 2011). Supervisory board members can compensate for managerial defi-
ciencies in SMEs by, for example, bringing specific knowledge and connections, 
advising on strategy or representing the firm’s interests in the community. Given 
the low resource pool of SMEs, such resource provision role adds higher value 
for small firms compared to large ones (Huse, 2005). However, in reality SME 
supervisory boards tend to act only within the formal role laid down by the law 
(ibid.) and the potential upside value from supervisory boards remains untapped, 
especially in the case of family firms (Brunninge & Nordqvist, 2004). 
The limited resource pool of SMEs also means that the cost aspect of choosing 
internal governance mechanisms is a restricting factor. For example, extensive 
control systems or hiring expensive consultants are typically unaffordable. 
  
 
1.3. Firm performance measurement 
The academic literature of firm performance measurement has evolved from 
mere productivity management in the early 20th century to modern integrated 
performance management (Bititci et al., 2012). While earlier literature and 
practice traditionally focused on financial performance, contemporary performance 
is discussed in a more balanced manner including both financial as well as non-
financial performance measures (Franco-Santos et al., 2012). Furthermore, the 
introduction of stakeholder theory in 1980s also brought the stakeholder goal 
attainment into the performance mix (Garengo et al., 2005; Bititci et al., 2012). 
Consequently, contemporary treatment of firm performance is a complex and 
multidimensional phenomenon (Dess & Robinson, 1984; Rauch et al., 2009; 
Richard et al., 2009).  
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Following the aforementioned logic of dividing performance into financial, 
non-financial and stakeholder dimensions, Venkatraman & Ramanujam (1986) 
offer a framework for discussing these different levels of performance. In their 
view, the narrowest conception of performance – financial performance – focuses 
on financial indicators (such as sales growth and profitability) which are assumed 
to reflect the fulfilment of the economic goals of the firm. The next level – busi-
ness performance – adds non-financial measures (e.g. strategic changes such as 
new product introduction or geographic expansion, product quality, operational 
efficiency, customer satisfaction, to name a few) to the performance mix. These 
measures may also be viewed as leading indicators for financial performance, 
while financial measures are lagging indicators. The first two levels in combi-
nation focus on the operational and strategic aspects of the firm and deal with 
questions of the efficiency and effectiveness of a firm’s activities (Brudan, 2010). 
The main difference between the two is that the former focuses only on financial 
metrics while the latter adds non-financial measures. The third level – organi-
zational effectiveness – takes into account the multiple and sometimes con-
flicting goals of various stakeholders of the firm and deals with the goal attainment 
of these stakeholders. In other words, it broadens the effectiveness dimension 
from goal attainment of the owners to goal attainment of all stakeholders.  
This classification, of course, only organizes the performance measurement 
and management discussion on a general level. Within each domain of perfor-
mance, substantial multidimensionality still remains with a variety of potentially 
available measurement indicators. For example, Combs et al. (2005) analysed 
how performance has been measured in Strategic Management Journal articles in 
the period 1980–2004 and identified 56 distinct measures that would fall into the 
financial and business performance dimensions. The majority (82%) were related 
to financial performance and accounting returns was the most common indicator 
within the financial indicators group (52%). Specifically relating to private firm 
performance measurement, Murphy et al. (1996) examined the empirical 
entrepreneurship literature for the years 1987–1993 and observed 71 different 
measures for performance, predominantly focusing on financial, but partially also 
business performance domains of performance measurement. The multitude of 
potential measures illustrates the complexity of firm performance assessment.  
An important aspect regarding performance measurement is the objectivity-
subjectivity scale and measurement difficulty of various indicators. Financial 
performance indicators are generally considered to be more objective and easier 
to measure than (non-financial) business indicators (Richard et al., 2009). At the 
same time, they are criticized for being backward-looking (Brudan, 2010), too 
narrow in focus, promoting short-termism, lacking strategic focus, encouraging 
local optimization and neglecting external factors (Melnyk et al., 2014). Business 
performance indicators deal with operational and strategic issues of a firm and, 
thus, are more forward-looking but sometimes more subjective and difficult to 
measure with precision (Brudan, 2010). Organizational effectiveness is con-
sidered to be the most subjective and difficult to measure, even to the point that 
Venkatraman & Ramanujam (1986) considered it practically inapplicable and 
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suggested avoiding it. Later research and debate on the topic still encourage 
including these more subjective measures of goal attainment of various stake-
holders, or the organizational effectiveness dimension, into the performance 
measurement mix (Harrison et al., 2020). Constructs such as Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG), Corporate Social Performance (CSP), Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR), triple bottom line and balanced scorecard are 
embodiments of attempts to measure the more subjective goal attainment of a 
wider range of stakeholders. 
 
 
1.4. Summary of literature review, research gaps and  
research questions of the thesis 
Corporate governance is a system by which firms are directed and controlled, and 
thus it is a vehicle for driving firm performance (see Figure 2). This is done by 
various governance mechanisms, some of which (external mechanisms) are 
imposed on a firm from its external environment, and some (internal mechanisms) 
are discretionary. This thesis and its empirical studies focus specifically on internal 
mechanisms, as these are the ones the firm can choose and design for itself. 
External mechanisms (relating to Estonian institutional settings) are imposed 
from outside and are considered only as contextual factors. The key internal 
contextual factors for this thesis are the firms being private and SMEs. Firm 
performance is a multi-dimensional construct involving financial performance, 
business performance and organizational effectiveness dimensions (Venkatraman 
& Ramanujam, 1986). The thesis explores the linkages of corporate governance 
to all of these performance dimensions, as called for by several authors (e.g. 
Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986; Murphy et al., 1996; Combs et al., 2005; 
Richard et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2. Framework for studying associations between corporate governance bundle 
and performance. Created by author. 
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The thesis aims to extend our knowledge on the linkages between corporate 
governance and firm performance in the context of private SMEs. Given the 
enormity of the subject matter, the thesis cannot possibly discuss all of the relevant 
aspects of the topic. Therefore, certain choices regarding what to cover and what 
to leave out of the empirical analyses were required. The following few para-
graphs explain the author’s rationale for selecting the aspects to be explored 
further and the development of research questions (RQs). 
The author believes that it is usually a good practice to start from the “big 
picture” of the topic and then proceed with a more comprehensive analysis of 
selected aspects of the “big picture”. Therefore, the empirical studies start with an 
exploration of how professional private SME owners (a private equity fund) design 
their corporate governance bundles. As discussed earlier, viewing corporate 
governance mechanisms in bundles is considered the appropriate approach in 
analysing the linkages to firm performance. Therefore, it is imperative to first 
explore the potential design of effective governance bundles in the context of 
private SMEs. While there will always be differences in details of the corporate 
governance bundles across firms, it can be argued that the mentioned contextual 
factors limit the variability sufficiently to discuss the general bundle that could 
be used in driving firm performance. In order to discuss effective corporate 
governance bundles, which internal mechanisms to include in it, and why, it is 
useful to study professional private SME owners, such as private equity funds. 
The core competence of private equity funds is to increase the value of private 
firms (in Estonia, typically SMEs) via improved corporate governance. This 
means they have extensive and invaluable practical experience in how to design 
corporate governance bundles to support performance improvement of a firm. 
Their experience and explanations regarding what, how and why are valuable in 
themselves but also provide a good starting point for deeper analysis of key 
governance mechanisms of the other two empirical studies. Therefore, the first 
research question of the thesis is the following: 
RQ1. How to design a corporate governance bundle that supports both 
financial performance and organizational effectiveness goals of private 
SMEs? 
 
After establishing the “big picture” as part of the RQ1, the author selected two 
key governance mechanisms – (1) characteristics of the management board and 
(2) making changes to the management board – and explored their associations 
with performance in RQs 2 and 3, respectively.  
The management board characteristics are especially important in the case of 
SMEs, as discussed in the literature review. SME boards are smaller than these 
of large firms, which means that the influence of each management board 
member is relatively stronger. Also, as small firms have fewer managerial levels 
and resources, including slack resources or buffers to cover the impact of bad 
decisions, the suitability of the management board is especially crucial for the 
success of SMEs. There is voluminous literature covering the links between 
corporate governance and financial performance of large public firms, but in the 
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private SME context, it is relatively sparse and requires more attention. Further-
more, studies within the private firm context usually suffer from data availability 
issues leading to various biases such as self-reporting or sampling bias. In the 
Estonian context the problem can be overcome due to the public availability of 
both corporate governance as well as financial data for all firms in Estonia in the 
official Estonian Business Register database. Thus, studying the association 
between corporate governance and financial performance in Estonia is facilitated 
by access to factual data across the population of firms.  
Therefore, RQ2 focuses on the governance mechanism of management board 
characteristics and its association with the financial performance of private SMEs. 
The second research question is as follows. 
RQ2. Is there a link between characteristics of management board and 
the financial performance of private SMEs? 
 
Study 3 continues by analysing how making changes to a private SME management 
board is associated with business performance, or more specifically expansion in 
the product-market scope of the firm. As already discussed, the characteristics of 
the management board are expected to be important for the firm’s performance. 
The importance comes from the human and social capital of the management 
board members, which means that different contextual factors (for example 
different firm scope) might require different aspects of human and social capital 
from the management board. Therefore, it can be expected that making changes 
to the management board, or in other words changing the human and social capital 
of the management board, might be associated with more successful implemen-
tation of strategic changes, which is an example of business performance as 
discussed in section 1.3 and presented on Figure 2. 
The ability to make strategic changes is an important, yet a difficult task for a 
firm due to factors such as organizational inertia. However, literature has shown 
that an appropriate corporate governance bundle can help in carrying out strategic 
changes such as expansion in a firm’s scope. However, the available literature has 
various limitations that still leave gaps in our knowledge. For example, previous 
studies have mostly looked at links between corporate governance and strategic 
change from a static perspective, i.e. independent variables in these models have 
tended to be typical corporate governance characteristics such as board size, hetero-
geneity and so on. There are only very few studies that take a dynamic perspective, 
i.e. look at how changes within corporate governance bundle (such as making 
changes to the management board) are associated with subsequent strategic change. 
Also, previous studies looking at links between corporate governance and 
business performance have mostly focused on large public firms while private 
SMEs have been relatively neglected, typically due to the same data availability 
issues discussed under RQ2, leaving an important gap to be filled. 
Therefore, the third research question of the thesis is as follows. 
RQ3. In the case of private SME’s, is there a link between the nomination 
of a new board member and subsequent strategic change in the form of an 









3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
3.1. Discussion of research questions 
This section discusses findings from empirical studies in relation to the objective 
and research questions of this thesis. The discussion relates the results from 
separate studies with each other and gives meaning to these findings in relation 
with the objective of the thesis.  
 
 
RQ1. How to design a corporate governance bundle that supports both 
financial performance and organizational effectiveness goals of private 
SMEs? 
Corporate governance can be viewed as a vehicle for driving firm performance. 
This, of course, means that in order to use corporate governance in such an instru-
mental way, there should be clarity in goals i.e. what the governance bundle 
should strive to achieve. The literature contrasts shareholder and stakeholder views, 
arguing whether the management should focus on maximizing shareholder value 
and ignore other stakeholders, or if it should try to balance the often-conflicting 
interests of all stakeholders (including shareholders). Study 1 provides some 
interesting insights regarding this dilemma. The case study firm – private equity 
fund BaltCap – holds a pro-stakeholder view as the basis of its corporate gover-
nance design, and as such, is in line with proponents of applying stakeholder 
theory in the corporate governance domain (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Aguilera et al., 
2008; García-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Harrison et al., 2020). Interviews held as 
part of the Study 1 bring out several points that show how the broader goal attain-
ment of various stakeholders also serves the financial goals of owners.  
First, a distinction should be made on financial performance over short and 
long periods. In a shorter time frame the management can maximise returns for 
owners at the expense of other stakeholders. However, in the long run, that would 
also be detrimental to the owners. For example, lay-offs or paying minimum wages 
might increase profits over the short time frame, but losing experienced employees 
limits firm growth opportunities, or even survival, in the longer run. Being 
negligent about environmental, social or local community issues might cut costs 
and increase profits in the short run, but negative image and bad publicity 
(examples of external governance mechanisms) can create problems over longer 
periods as consumers might be put off by the firm’s irresponsible actions. While 
managers in public firms are typically pressured for short term quarterly results 
by small, diversified and often non-committed shareholders, private firm owners 
cannot sell their shares that easily as their firms are illiquid assets, and thus, are 
more stable in their ownership role and can afford a longer-term view on the 
firm’s actions. Such stable and concentrated ownership potentially relieves short-
term pressure on management and enables it to take a longer perspective. Of 
course, it does not mean that this is always done. 
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Second, financial returns for owners are typically gauged in net profits or other 
similar profitability measures, but alternatively an increase in the intrinsic value 
of the firm can be prioritized, as it was in the case of the private equity fund. 
While actual net profits are historical facts and thus backward-looking, intrinsic 
value (for example calculated based on the discounted cash flow method) depends 
on future cash flows and riskiness thereof, and thus, is forward-looking. There-
fore, sacrificing short term profits for strengthening its resource base, including 
immaterial resources such as customer and supplier relations, employee engage-
ment or reduced environmental impact, might improve future cash flows and 
decrease their risk levels, which in turn increases the value of the firm. Focusing 
on historical financial results is clearly an easier task than considering the 
potential future outlook, which is quite a subjective estimate. However, the private 
equity firm sees clear value in focusing on the future, even if it is not that 
objectively measurable. Of course, this does not mean that current results do not 
matter at all. These objectivity-subjectivity and backward- or forward-looking 
performance measurement dilemmas add to related academic debates held by 
authors such as Venkatraman & Ramanujam, (1986), Richard et al., (2009) and 
Harrison et al., (2020). 
Third, stakeholder goal attainment and owners’ financial returns can be viewed 
through the value creation and value protection prism. The more value a firm 
creates for all stakeholders, the more value there potentially is also for owners’ 
financial returns. So, the corporate governance bundle should not merely deal 
with protecting owners’ financial interests, but also emphasize the value creation 
of a firm, which is in line with arguments brought forward by authors such as 
Uhlaner et al. (2007), Huse et al. (2011) and Aguilera et al. (2016). Thus, based 
on the findings of Study 1, it could be argued that in the long run, focusing on the 
organizational effectiveness dimension of performance, i.e. goal attainment of all 
stakeholders, is also beneficial for owners’ financial interests. Governance 
mechanisms in the bundle should support both of these goals.  
Study 1 also provides a template on how to design a corporate governance 
bundle for private firms which can help achieve both financial and organizational 
effectiveness goals. Figure 3 schematically presents the private equity logic for 
building such a governance bundle by showing the key activities owners and 
supervisory board perform and related governance mechanisms resulting from 
these activities. Also, the focus areas addressed by respective mechanisms are 




Figure 3. Template for designing private SME corporate governance bundle. Created by 
author 
 
Before explaining the logic of Figure 3, a few comments need to be made. First, 
in the situation of a one-tier board, Figure 3 should be adjusted so that the super-
visory board’s activities are performed by the owners themselves. For example, in 
case of Estonia (the study setting country) laws allow for the firm not to create a 
supervisory board. For very small firms with very limited resources that option 
might be feasible as the costs of a value adding supervisory board might outweigh 
the benefits. Second, the model is a simplification of reality. In actual life, there 
are more links between variables than just the relatively linear depiction of the 
main interactions. Also, additional activities or mechanisms might be relevant in 
certain contexts. Furthermore, governance mechanisms might have other or several 
addressable theoretical governance issues. The area depicted on figure is the 
typical logic used in the literature. For example, a code of conduct or managerial 
key performance indicators are viewed as vehicles for capping managerial 
opportunism or inappropriate behaviour, i.e. these mechanisms address the vertical 
agency problem and, therefore, focus on value protection. However, the same 
mechanisms might also be viewed as vehicles for the empowering of or provision 





Actors Activities Mechanisms 
Define long-term performance goals 
Define working principles Code of conduct 
Hire competent SB
Ensure appropriate managerial capacity Nominate & replace MB members 
Set performance targets for management Managerial KPIs 
Motivate management Managerial incentive system 
Control management SB’s control role 
Advise management SB’s advisory role 
Provide connections to external resources SB’s resource provision role 
Abbreviations 
SB – Supervisory board  
MB – Management board 
KPI – Key performance indicator
Shareholders agreement 
Focus area of the mechanism 
Value protection Value creation
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The key principle within the framework for value creation as well as 
protection is active ownership. Active ownership starts from understanding and 
articulating the goals of the firm, i.e. what kind of performance is expected in all 
discussed domains, and what are the key principles based on which the 
performance is expected to be achieved. When there is more than one owner in 
the firm, then having an agreement regarding these goals and principles is advis-
able. For example, a shareholders’ agreement might be an appropriate governance 
mechanism for that. Based on the private equity experience in Study 1, 
discussing, negotiating and signing such a document is a great way to align the 
interests of all owners. Such a document also serves as a governance mechanism 
for protecting the interests of minority owners and thus deals with horizontal 
agency issues (Roe, 2004). Such common goals and working principles from the 
owners’ side makes it easier to communicate and align interests with the manage-
ment team via, for example, related governance mechanisms such as managerial 
key performance indicators (including also wider performance indicators dealing 
with stakeholders in the organizational effectiveness domain, e.g. in the form 
Environmental, Social and Governance indicators used by BaltCap in Study 1), 
incentive systems and codes of conduct, that incentivize the management to work 
towards the goals within the limits of agreed-upon working principles. These 
mechanisms complement each other (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008) 
and alleviate potential agency conflicts between owners and managers as well as 
between different owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Roe, 2004; Ward, 2009).  
Active ownership does not necessarily mean that owners should also manage 
the firm, although results from Study 2 indicate that when owners are on the 
management board, at least the financial performance tends to be better. Alterna-
tively, owners can also take an active stance by staffing an active and competent 
supervisory board as well as participating in the work of the supervisory board. 
The experience from the private equity fund presented in Study 1 shows that the 
key governance mechanisms to be included in the bundle revolve around selecting 
and incentivising the management team, staffing a functional supervisory board 
and creating a good and supporting work atmosphere within each and between the 
two. Indeed, Study 1 interviewees emphasized that private equity largely “invests 
into the management of the firm”, i.e. the qualities of the management team are 
a pre-requisite for superior performance of a firm. The importance of managerial 
characteristics is also evident from Studies 2 and 3. Results from Study 2 indicate 
that some individual and collective traits of management boards, e.g. management 
board size and managerial age profile, are associated with financial performance 
(see also discussion under RQ 2). Similarly, Study 3 shows that nominating new 
management board members, i.e. altering the human and social capital of the 
management board, is supportive of subsequent strategic changes of the firm, i.e. 
the business performance of the firm is related to managerial characteristics (see 
also discussion under RQ 3).  
The supervisory board as a governance mechanism has an important role 
within the private equity model. Staffing the board with experienced and motivated 
people is seen as a source for value creation. This is in line with academic 
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arguments brought forward by authors such as Uhlaner et al. (2007) and many 
others. Private equity fund in Study 1 prefers relatively small supervisory boards 
of five people. Nonetheless, as the boards are still bigger than the minimum 
required by Estonian law (three members), it indicates that private equity sees 
value in recruiting these people to the board. The size of a supervisory board 
reflects on one hand cost-consciousness (a relevant contingency factor for 
SMEs), but also more focused team-work within the supervisory board. Results 
from Study 2 show that in the case of private SMEs, a smaller management team 
is associated with better financial performance. This finding may not be directly 
applicable also to supervisory boards, but some parallels may be drawn, subject 
to verification in future studies. The supervisory board has various roles in the 
private equity model as presented in Study 1. Their advisory and resource provision 
roles are governance mechanisms that have their roots in resource dependence 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and stewardship (Davis et al., 1997) theories and 
support management in value creation. Their controlling role, on the other hand, 
is related to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and deals with value 
protection. Advisory, resource provision and controlling roles are enacted via 
regular and frequent contacts with the management team. 
In summary, the corporate governance bundle template designed by the 
private equity firm for its private SME investees includes several internal gover-
nance mechanisms as discussed above. The mechanisms work within the wider 
framework provided by external governance mechanisms applicable in Estonia, 
such as laws, regulations, professional and social norms, traditional and social 
media, to name a few examples. Both internal as well as external governance 
mechanisms in the bundle collectively deal with value creation as well as stipu-
lating principles for value division among stakeholders and value protection for 
shareholders. As such, the bundle could (and should) be viewed through several 
theoretical lenses – agency, stewardship, resource dependence, upper echelons, 
stakeholder and institutional – in order to grasp the complexity of corporate 
governance in a holistic manner.  
 
 
RQ2. Is there a link between characteristics of management board and the 
financial performance of private SMEs? 
As discussed under RQ1, the private equity fund considers the selection of an 
appropriate management board, as well as its relations with owners, critical for 
the performance of private SMEs. Results of Study 2 provide some confirmatory 
evidence, that some characteristics of management boards and ownership are 
indeed associated with the financial performance of private SMEs.  
Study 2 took a multidimensional view of financial performance. Namely, 
using the Altman’s Score (Altman et al., 2017), which is an aggregate measure 
consisting of indicators of liquidity, financial leverage and periodic as well as 
cumulative profitability. As the Altman Score was originally used for failure 
prediction, it could also be interpreted as a forward-looking performance measure. 
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This links with the backward-looking accounting data versus forward-looking 
intrinsic value discussion under RQ 1. It may be argued that by lowering the 
failure risk of a firm, the management increases the intrinsic value of the firm.  
The findings from Study 2 indicate that smaller management boards, higher 
age of management team members, managerial ownership and being less engaged 
with multiple directorships were found to be associated with lower failure risk, 
or in other words, better financial performance. On the other hand, gender hetero-
geneity in the management board, tenure of the management board members and 
ownership concentration did not have any significant association with failure risk. 
A more detailed analysis by size and age groups gives a more mixed picture as 
presented on Table 4. The table summarizes whether a studied variable was found 
to be positive, negative or insignificant for financial performance. Note that in 
Study 2 the dependent variable was failure risk, which is the inverse of financial 
performance (as defined in this thesis), i.e. the signs of variables compared to 
Study 2 are opposite. For example, while Study 2 finds that larger management 
boards have significant positive association with failure risk, Table 4 states that 
the association with a firm’s financial performance is negative.  
 














Negative Negative Insignificant Negative Insignificant 
Gender 
heterogeneity 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Managers’ 
age 
Positive Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Multiple 
directorships 
Negative Negative Negative Negative Insignificant 
Tenure of 
managers 
Insignificant Positive Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Ownership 
concentration 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Managerial 
ownership 
Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Source: Created by author. Note: For the construction of this table 0.01 p-value to determine the 
(in)significance of variables has been used. 
 
                                                                          
5  The firms in the “larger” group are still SMEs. 
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A detailed interpretation of these results is presented in Study 2 and not repeated 
here. However, the broader themes emerging from these findings are the following. 
First, the findings illustrate the relevance of contingency factors and cost aspect 
of governance mechanisms in corporate governance research (Aguilera et al., 
2008). For example, the analysis shows that larger management boards hinder 
financial performance especially in the case of smaller and younger firms. As 
firms get older and bigger, the relationship becomes insignificant. The smaller 
and younger the firms are, the more likely they are to be more resource-
constrained and larger management boards are not justified from a cost-benefit 
perspective. While more management board members would increase firms’ 
human and social capital (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) 
and might improve the quality of decisions (for example through adding per-
spectives and experiences), the cost of these additional management board 
members might outweigh the benefits from better decisions.  
Second, it seems that the financial performance of small private firms is more 
linked to the speed of decision-making as opposed to a more balanced but slower 
deliberation on the management board. This is indicated by the fact that variables 
related to potentially having multiple perspectives and experiences present on the 
management board (larger management board and gender heterogeneity) are 
either insignificant or negative with regard to financial performance. Similarly, 
multiple directorships (that is being a board member in several firms simul-
taneously) is a distracting factor which might slow down decision-making and is 
found to be negative in all cases, except older firms where processes might be 
more established and decisions delegated to lower levels. Also, an overlap in 
ownership and management (variable managerial ownership), which removes the 
potential necessity of discussion between owners and managers, also speeds up 
decision-making and is positive for financial performance.  
Third, managerial ownership alleviates the agency problem and is found to be 
positive for firm performance. This is an indication of the importance of having 
the right incentive system (another key governance mechanism) for management, 
as also discussed under RQ1. Study 2 did not analyse other potential managerial 
incentive systems (e.g. variable pay related to performance or option schemes) 
and their relationship to the financial performance of private SMEs, but that could 
be an interesting avenue for further research. 
In general, it may be concluded from the findings that there is a link between 
characteristics of management boards and firms’ financial performance. This is 
further supported by a finding from Study 3, which showed that there is a signif-
icant positive association between previous export experience of a new manage-
ment board member and the probability of the firm starting to export. The finding 
does not address directly the financial performance of the firm but the inter-
mediary step of strategic change. However, a firm starting to export is also likely 
to have an impact on the financial performance of the firm. Therefore, the com-
position and motivation of a management board are indeed important governance 
mechanisms. Owners and supervisory boards are advised to carefully select 
management board members with appropriate human and social capital that suit 
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the context of the firm. Small firms might not be able to afford several manage-
ment board members (costs of several board members outweigh marginal benefits), 
so choosing the right person to lead the firm is of paramount importance. 
 
 
RQ3. In the case of private SME’s, is there a link between the nomination 
of a new board member and subsequent strategic change in the form of an 
expansion in the product-market scope of the firm? 
One of the conclusions from RQ1 and RQ2 was that composing the management 
team of members whose human and social capital are appropriate for the specific 
context of the firm is important for achieving superior performance. RQ3 takes 
the discussion one step further and adopts a dynamic view by analysing the 
association between change to management boards (i.e. change in corporate 
governance bundle), and the business performance of private SMEs. Specifically, 
Study 3 analysed business performance from the perspective of implementing 
strategic change in the form of expansion of firms’ scope (Ansoff, 1957). Namely, 
whether after nomination of a new management board member, the firm expands 
into new industries or new geographical markets. In case of the latter the study 
separately analysed firms entering their first export market and already exporting 
firms expanding into additional geographical markets (this was done due to the 
difference in the relative difficulties of these two expansion types). Expansion 
into new markets or industries requires firms to obtain new capabilities and make 
investments, and as such can be classified as strategic activities, and the outcome 
of these activities illustrates business performance of the firm. Although Study 3 
did not specifically analyse it, such expansion in firm scope, if executed success-
fully, opens new growth areas and value creation opportunities for the firm and 
as such, also has the potential for improving the financial performance of the firm. 
The results of Study 3 found associations between change in the management 
board and different expansion types, although there were differences in the 
details. For example, it was found that starting to export might benefit most from 
nomination of a new board member, especially if he or she had prior export 
experience. Diversification into new industries was also associated with prior 
nomination of a new management board member, although the significance level 
was lower (p<0.05 compared to p<0.01 in case of starting to export) while 
expanding into additional export markets for already exporting firms was not 
associated with prior change in the management board. There were also dif-
ferences when analysing age and size control variables of firms. Detailed analysis 
and discussion of these findings is provided in Study 3 and not repeated here. 
Nonetheless, the wider conclusion related to the whole thesis coming out of these 
findings is that, indeed, managerial characteristics matter at least for some types 
of strategic performance. Bringing in new management board members might 
give firms a boost in making strategic changes and through that, create additional 
value for the firm. This conclusion also illustrates the importance of resource-
based theories (e.g. Barney, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) within the corporate 
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governance domain. The explanation as to why new management board member(s) 
might bring about subsequent strategic changes might be related to the new 
resources they bring with them. Resources such as specific knowledge, experience, 
connections in export markets or new industries, as well as personal traits such 
as ambition, energy levels or leadership style all play a role in the value creation 
process of the firm and should be considered in the corporate governance bundle 
design. 
In conclusion, the selection of the management board members is a very 
important governance mechanism in the hands of the supervisory board and 
owners of the firm. This finding supports the conclusion from Study 2 that 
management board characteristics are linked with firm (financial) performance 
as well as is in alignment with one of the key points from the Study 1 where private 
equity clearly stated that they invest largely in the management of the firm.  
 
 
3.2. Contributions to literature 
The thesis contributes to various strands of literature as highlighted below.  
1. It is widely accepted that different contexts require different corporate gover-
nance approaches (e.g. Huse, 2005), yet the majority of research still discusses 
large public firms and smaller private firms do not get enough attention 
(Uhlaner et al., 2007, Li et al., 2020). This thesis, in contrast, contributes to 
theoretical literature by focusing specifically on corporate governance in the 
private SME context. The thesis outlines the factors that differentiate private 
firms from public ones and SMEs from large firms as well as discusses how 
and why these differences are relevant for corporate governance research. 
Furthermore, all empirical studies within the thesis discuss certain aspects of 
corporate governance and their links to various domains of performance 
specifically in case of private SMEs. 
2. The thesis contributes to the comparative corporate governance literature 
(e.g. Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Schiell et al., 2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014; 
Hooghiemstra et al., 2015; Clarke, 2016) by focusing on firms operating in 
Continental European (specifically Estonian) governance model. The Conti-
nental European model has received less attention in governance research that 
by default tends to assume the Anglo-American model.  
3. Study 1 of the thesis contributes to both corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility literature by discussing the interface between the two 
phenomena. The literature of the interrelations of these phenomena is frag-
mented (Jain & Jamali, 2016), especially in the contexts of private SMEs and 
smaller markets (e.g. Estapé-Dubreuil et al., 2016; Jamali et al., 2017; Amos, 
2018; López-Pérez et al., 2018). Study 1 demonstrates the logic of why CSR 
focus of private SMEs is not only a “nice thing to do” but how it is valuable 
also for the owners of the firm.  
4. Study 1 also contributes to the corporate governance literature stream focusing 
on how to govern firms rather than who governs them. The majority of the 
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literature and empirical studies in this field tend to focus on the latter, i.e. 
studies quantitatively analyse various characteristics of corporate governance 
actors (owners, supervisory and management board members), but the dis-
cussion on the how part is lacking, e.g. various roles of the actors or processes 
within the corporate governance (Li et al., 2020). Study 1 focuses specifically 
on the how part and presents an actual corporate governance bundle that pro-
fessional private firm owners (a private equity fund) use in governing their 
investee firms together with explanations regarding why these mechanisms in 
the bundle are important and how they are interrelated. 
5. Study 2 contributes to both corporate governance and firm failure litera-
ture by analysing associations between corporate governance variables and 
failure risk of private SMEs, a context that is very little researched (Ciampi, 
2015; 2017). Study 2 findings are a valuable addition to the very limited 
number of analyses available in the private SME space. Interestingly, a recent 
study by Almaskati et al. (2021) concluded that the addition of corporate 
governance variables into failure prediction models significantly improves 
their accuracy, meaning that the topic has imminent academic as well as 
practical value.  
6. Study 3 contributes to corporate governance and strategic change litera-
ture by demonstrating associations between changes in the corporate gover-
nance bundle and subsequent strategic change. Studies focusing on the 
dynamic interface between the two phenomena are limited (e.g. Boeker, 
1997; Elosge et al., 2018). The findings of Study 3 add to this sparsely re-
searched area. 
7. This thesis adds to the discussion of the usage of different theoretical 
paradigms within the corporate governance debate. The thesis argues that in 
the case of private SMEs the agency theory is neither optimal nor sufficient to 
explain what, how and why is happening in corporate governance. Additional 
theories such as resource dependence theory or resource-based view add 
important aspects and viewpoints to explain corporate governance in that 
segment. As such, the thesis is in line with and supports arguments proposed 
by authors like Uhlaner et al. (2007), Aguilera et al. (2008), Huse et al. (2011) 
and Li et al. (2020). 
 
 
3.3. Practical implications 
The thesis also provides several practical implications for private SME owners 
who wish to improve the performance of their firms. Specific implications that 
have already been presented in each individual Study are not repeated here. 
Instead, the implications here are more related to the overall objective of the 
thesis and as such combine the implications from individual studies to a more 
general level. 
1. The thesis presents an actual corporate governance bundle used by pro-
fessional private firm owners. This could serve as a template for other private 
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SME owners for enhancing the performance of their firms. The details within 
the template might need to be adjusted for the context or goals of a particular 
firm, but the basic framework is still useful.  
2. The thesis shows the importance of active ownership. This does not neces-
sarily mean that an owner should take managerial role in the firm. The 
activeness could be related to being truly interested in the performance of the 
firm, taking an active stance in general goal-setting and strategy planning of 
the firm and supporting the management as and when needed.  
3. As an example of active ownership, the thesis shows that by reconfiguring 
some key mechanisms within the corporate governance bundle, the owners 
might be able to change the course of the firm towards desired outcomes. 
This demonstrates that the corporate governance bundle truly is a tool in the 
hands of owners for controlling and directing their firms. 
4. The thesis highlights the various roles held by and the respective value created 
by supervisory boards. In addition to the control function, the supervisory 
board can advise the management, support with knowledge and experience, 
facilitate the acquisition of resources and provide links to external stake-
holders. The supervisory board tends to be an under-utilised resource in the 
SME segment, but more meaningful usage of this resource might help unlock 
further upside potential for these firms. 
5. The thesis outlines different dimensions of firm performance and discusses 
the characteristics and differences of the dimensions as well as links between 
them (e.g. leading and lagging; backward-looking and forward-looking, short-
term and long-term oriented, objectively measured and subjectively assessed, 
pro-shareholder and pro-stakeholder). Awareness of the multifaceted nature 
of firm performance is helpful for SME owners, supervisory and management 
board members in goal setting and strategizing processes as well as corporate 
governance bundle design efforts. 
6. Study 3 highlights the relevance of previous export experience on private SME 
management board when attempting to start exporting. This is an important 
aspect to bear in mind for owners and supervisory board members who plan 
to start exporting, but also for policy makers when, for example, designing 
support schemes to promote exports by SMEs. 
 
 
3.4. Limitations and avenues for further research 
The thesis has applied an exploratory research approach by first discussing the 
“big picture” (i.e. corporate governance bundle design for private SMEs) and then 
proceeding with analysis of selected details of the “big picture” (i.e. associations 
between certain corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance). Such 
an approach was selected as previous corporate governance research in the private 
SME context is fragmented and requires a holistic exploratory overview that sets 
ground for future studies in this particular context. The research design choices 
taken in the thesis allowed to make several contributions to literature and to develop 
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various practical implications. However, the choices also resulted in certain 
limitations that need to be considered in conjunction with the findings of the thesis, 
as explained below. The limitations discussed herein are general and related to 
the thesis in its entirety. In addition to these, individual Studies present additional, 
more detailed limitations related to respective Studies, such details are not 
repeated here. 
First, given the vastness of the topic and space limitations, the thesis could not 
possibly analyse in detail all corporate governance mechanisms and their asso-
ciations with firm performance. Therefore, quantitative analyses (Studies 2 and 3) 
closely examined the characteristics of the management board and changes to the 
management board in relation to the financial and business performance of firms. 
However, as presented in Study 1, there are many other important governance 
mechanisms that were not covered in comparable depth and need to be studied 
further. For example, mechanisms like managerial incentive systems, designing 
and modifying performance measurement systems, nominating new or additional 
supervisory board members and altering the co-operation processes between 
supervisory and management boards might open new avenues for firm develop-
ment. 
Second, the thesis discusses private SME governance in the context of the 
Continental European governance model using Estonia as the study setting. 
While the Estonian institutional context is part of the Continental European gover-
nance model and thus is an applicable example, there may still be certain dif-
ferences compared to other countries belonging to the Continental European 
model. The overall logic and key variables (such as legislation and typical owner-
ship and financing structures, to name a few) are comparable within the group of 
countries, but there may be differences in some details, for example details in 
business laws, cultural differences and impact of historic background. Thus, 
when transferring the findings of the thesis to another Continental European 
model country, it is advisable to consider these potential differences. 
As the private SME governance research is still fragmented, there are many 
opportunities for future research. For example, future research could continue 
exploring associations between other governance mechanisms (that were not 
quantitatively analysed within this thesis) and firm performance. Furthermore, 
future studies could attempt to establish not only associations but also causalities 
between these variables. Similar analyses could also be conducted in other Con-
tinental European model countries to detect and discuss any potential differences 
that might appear due to distinctions in external governance mechanisms. Also, 
similar research would be interesting in other governance models (e.g. Anglo-
American) where such external governance mechanisms differ to a greater degree 
compared to Continental European model countries, and therefore the design of 
internal governance bundles might differ more significantly. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN – KOKKUVÕTE 
Väikeste ja keskmise suurusega eraettevõtete valitsemine 
ja tulemuslikkus 
Töö aktuaalsus ja motivatsioon 
Ettevõtete valitsemist on eraldiseisva distsipliinina akadeemiliselt uuritud kõigest 
umbes 40 aastat, alates 1980ndatest. Seega on tegu suhteliselt noore valdkonnaga 
võrreldes näiteks juhtimisteadusega. Kui ettevõtete juhtimise valdkonnas toimus 
kogu 20. sajandi jooksul märkimisväärne areng ning loodi hulk teooriaid, 
raamistikke ja mõttemudeleid erinevates juhtimise aladistsipliinides (nt. finants-
juhtimine, turundusjuhtimine, protsesside juhtimine), siis ettevõtete valitsemise 
aspektid said tähelepanu alles 20. sajandi viimastel kümnenditel. Samas, 21. sajand 
võib osutuda ettevõtete valitsemise sajandiks, kuna fookus liigub üha rohkem 
äriühingute legitiimsuse, tulemuslikkuse ja mõjususe saavutamisele (Tricker, 
2018). 
Ettevõtete valitsemist on siiani valdavalt uuritud suurte börsil noteeritud ette-
võtete näitel Anglo-Ameerika riikide kontekstis. Samas on enamik ettevõtteid 
väikese ja keskmise suurusega6 eraettevõtted7, ning Anglo-Ameerika ettevõtete 
valitsemise mudel on ainult üks paljudest. Järeldused, mis on tehtud Anglo-
Ameerika suurte börsiettevõtete kontekstis ei pruugi kehtida väikeste eraette-
võtete puhul Kontinentaal-Euroopas, kuna kontekst on erinev (Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; Huse, 2007; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Clarke, 2016; Armitage 
et al., 2017).  
Varasemad uuringud on tuginenud enamasti agenditeooriale (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) ning tegelenud juhtkonna vastutuse, riskide minimeerimise ja 
omaniku väärtuse maksimeerimisega. Kuna agenditeooriat on ettevõtete valitse-
mise kontekstis kritiseeritud kui liigselt kitsast ning lihtsustavat teooriat (Roberts 
et al., 2005; Kumar & Zattoni, 2019), on aja jooksul uuringute aluseks lisandunud 
mitmeid muid teooriaid, näiteks ressursisõltuvuse teooria (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), kõrgema ešeloni teooria (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), 
sidusgruppide teooria (Freeman, 1984) ja institutsiooniteooria (North, 1990). On 
ka leitud, et arvestades ettevõtete valitsemise komplekssust on vastavates uurin-
gutes mõistlik rakendada mitmeid teooriaid üheaegselt (Li et al., 2020).  
Kirjeldatud laienemine teoreetiliste aluste kasutamisel ning üldised majandus-
likud ja sotsiaalsed muutused ühiskonnas (Filatotchev et al., 2020) on tõstnud 
fookusesse teemasid, mida agenditeoreetiline käsitlus ignoreeris. Riskide 
                                                                          
6  Doktoritöö keskendub väikese ja keskmise suurusega eraettevõtetele. Teksti parema loeta-
vuse huvides kasutatakse töös terminit „väikesed eraettevõtted“, mis hõlmab endas nii väikeseid 
kui keskmise suurusega eraettevõtteid. 
7  Eraettevõtte all mõeldakse doktoritöös börsil noteerimata ettevõtet. Teisiti öeldes, eraette-
võtet käsitletakse vastandina börsil noteeritud ettevõttele, mitte kui vastandit riigile kuuluvale 
ettevõttele.  
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minimeerimisele lisaks on hakatud rohkem uurima, kuidas ettevõtete valitsemise 
toel ettevõtete väärtust tõsta ning tulemuslikkust parandada (e.g. Uhlaner et al, 
2007; Huse et al., 2011; Aguilera et al., 2016). Omanike väärtuse maksimeerimise 
(e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) kõrval on tähelepanu saanud ka muude sidus-
gruppide ootuste täitmine ja ettevõtete ühiskondlik vastutus (Freeman, 1984; 
Brink, 2010; García-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Barney, 2018). Fookuse laiene-
mine ainult omanikelt teistele huvigruppidele on muutnud ka ettevõtte tulemus-
likkuse käsitlusi. Omanike finantstulu eesmärkide saavutamise asemel on hakatud 
tegelema tasakaalu leidmisega kõigi huvigruppide eesmärkide saavutamisel 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Harrison et al., 2020). 
Kokkuvõtlikult, ettevõtete valitsemise uuringud on varasemalt keskendunud 
valdavalt suurte Anglo-Ameerika börsil noteeritud ettevõtete kontekstile ning 
juhtkonna vastutusele omanike ees. Aja jooksul on uuringute fookus laienenud, 
kuid palju tööd on veel teha fookuse tasakaalustamisel (Uhlaner et al., 2007; 
Brunninge et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2014, Neckebrouck et al., 2019). Doktoritöö 
keskendub ettevõtete valitsemisele suhteliselt vähe uuritud väikeste eraettevõtete 




Uurimiseesmärgid ja -ülesanded 
Doktoritöö eesmärk on laiendada meie teadmisi seostest väikeste eraettevõtete 
valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vahel.  
 
Doktoritööle on seatud järgmised uurimisülesanded: 
1. Kontseptuaalse raamistiku loomine uurimaks ettevõtete valitsemise ja ette-
võtete tulemuslikkuse seoseid üldisel tasandil. 
2. Väikeste eraettevõtete eripärade analüüs ettevõtete valitsemise kontekstis. 
3. Ettevõtete tulemuslikkuse käsitluste analüüs. 
4. Uurimislünkade tuvastamine väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemise ja tulemus-
likkuse seoseid käsitlevas akadeemilises kirjanduses. 
5. Doktoritöö jaoks uurimisküsimuste määratlemine tuginedes varasema kirjan-
duse ülevaatele ning uurimislünkadele. 
6. Empiiriliste uuringute läbi viimine ja esitamine. 
7. Uurimisküsimuste tulemuste analüüs, akadeemilise ja praktilise väärtuse esit-
lemine, töö piirangute ja tulevaste uurimissuundade kokkuvõte. 
 
 
Uurimismetoodika ja andmed 
Doktoritöö tugineb kolmel empiirilisel uurimistööl, mis analüüsivad väikeste 
eraettevõtete valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse seoseid erinevate vaatenurkade alt ja 
tuginedes erinevatele meetoditele. Tabel 1 esitab kokkuvõtte kasutatud meetoditest 
ning peamistest andmetest. 
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Tabel 1. Uurimismetoodika ja andmete kokkuvõte. 
Uurimus Meetod Andmed 
1 Kaasus-
analüüs 
Teisesed andmed: BaltCapi aastaaruanded, ühiskondliku 
vastutuse koodeks, ühiskondliku vastutuse (ESG) raportid 
aastate 2011–2018 kohta ja portfelliettevõtete ülevaated. 
Esmased andmed: poolstruktureeritud intervjuud. 
2 Logistiline 
regressioon 
67,058 Eesti väikest eraettevõtet. Andmed Äriregistrist. 
Sõltuv muutuja: ebaõnnestumise risk. 
Sõltumatud muutujad: juhatuse liikmete arv; juhatuse 
sooline heterogeensus; juhatuse liikmeks oleku aeg; juhatuse 
liikmete vanus; mitme ettevõtte juhatuses olek; omanike 
kontsentratsioon ja juhatuse ning omanike kattuvus. 
3 Logistiline 
regressioon 
16,941 Eesti väikest eraettevõtet. Andmed Äriregistrist. 
Sõltuvad muutujad: ekspordi alustamine; laienemine uutele 
eksporditurgudele; laienemine uutesse 
tegevusvaldkondadesse, üldine strateegiline muutus. Iga 
sõltuva muutuja kohta 3 eraldi mudelit: 1) kitsendusteta, 
2) stabiilsuse kitsendusega, 3) suuruse kitsendusega. 
: uue juhatuse liikme määramine. 
Allikas: Autori koostatud. 
 
 
Kirjanduse ülevaade ja uurimisküsimused 
Kirjanduse ülevaade on jagatud neljaks alapeatükis (vt joonis 1). Esimene ala-
peatükk analüüsib ettevõtete valitsemist kontseptuaalsel tasemel. Avatakse pea-
miste mõistete sisu ja seosed eri mõistete vahel. Seejärel tuuakse teises alapea-
tükis välja väikeste eraettevõtete eripärad ning nende mõju ettevõtete valitse-
misele. Kolmas alapeatükk käsitleb ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse mõõtmise mitme-
tahulisust. Neljas alapeatükk seob kokku esimeses kolmes alapeatükis käsitletud 
teemad ning esitab doktoritöö uurimisküsimused.  
 
 










Ettevõtete valitsemise kontseptuaalne ülevaade 
Ettevõtete valitsemine on ettevõtete suunamise ja kontrollimise süsteem 
(Cadbury, 1992). Erinevate valitsemise mehhanismide abil (Ward et al., 2009) 
jagatakse ettevõtte omanike, nõukogu ja juhatuse vahel võim, rollid ja vastutus-
alad (Roe, 2004). Vastav rolli- ja võimujaotus mõjutab ettevõtte tipptasemel 
tehtavaid otsuseid ning seeläbi tulemuslikkust (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Hambrick, 2007). 
Valitsemise mehhanismid jagunevad välisteks ja sisesteks mehhanismideks 
(Walsh & Seward, 1990). Välised mehhanismid – näiteks seadusandlus, kultuuri-
lised normid, äritavad – on kohaspetsiifilised ja piirkonniti erinevad, mistõttu 
uuritakse neid tavaliselt riikide või suuremate piirkondade tasandil (Aslan & 
Kumar, 2014; Millar, 2014; Schiell et al., 2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014; Hoog-
hiemstra et al., 2015). Need mehhanismid mõjutavad ettevõtet väljast ja pole 
seega ettevõtte enda kontrolli all. Samas mõjutavad nad siseste mehhanismide 
valikuid, näiteks tehes mõne sisese mehhanismi mingis piirkonnas kätte-
saamatuks või ebamõistlikult kalliks (Doidge et al., 2007). See on ka üks oluline 
põhjus, miks ei saa mingis geograafilises piirkonnas tehtud järeldusi automaatselt 
üle kanda teise piirkonda (Judge et al., 2008). Sisemisi mehhanisme – näiteks 
juhatuse motivatsioonisüsteem, aktsionäride leping, kontrollsüsteemid – kujun-
davad ettevõtted endale ise, et parandada tulemuslikkust. Tulemuslikkuse paran-
damisel on kaks poolt: negatiivsete tulemuste vältimine ning positiivsete tule-
muste toetamine. Negatiivse tulemuse tüüpiline näide on agenditeoorias (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) kirjeldatud omanike ja juhatuse huvide konflikt, millest tule-
nevalt võib juhatus lähtuda isiklikest, mitte omanike või ettevõtte laiematest huvi-
dest. Sellist riski võivad vähendada näiteks juhatuse motivatsioonisüsteem, mis 
ühildab juhatuse ja omanike huve, tõhus kontrollsüsteem või nõukogu kontroll-
funktsioon. Positiivsete tulemuste toetamise näiteks on nõukogu nõustav roll, 
mille raames nõukogu liikmed abistavad juhatust oma funktsionaalsete või vald-
kondlike kompetentsidega, kontaktide võrgustikuga või võimekusega hankida 
muid vajalikke ressursse. Tuginedes ressursipõhisele teooriale (Barney, 1991) ja 
ressursisõltuvuse teooriale (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) sõltub konkurentsieelise 
saavutamine ning kaitsmine vajalike ressursside olemasolust või välistele 
ressurssidele ligipääsust. 
Ettevõtteid valitsetakse seega mitmete väliste ja siseste mehhanismide abil. 
Vastavat mehhanismide kogumit nimetatakse ettevõtte valitsemise mehha-
nismide komplektiks (i.k. corporate governance bundle). Erialases kirjanduses 
on üldiselt aktsepteeritud seisukoht, et ettevõtte tulemuslikkus sõltub mehha-
nismide komplektist, mitte igast üksikust mehhanismist eraldiseisvalt (Rediker & 
Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2009; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; 
Filatotchev & Wright, 2017). Nimetatud asjaolu tuleneb mehhanismide komple-
mentaarsuse ja asendatavuse printsiipidest. Komplementaarsus tähendab, et 
komplektis olevate mehhanismide mõjud on omavahel interaktsioonis. Lisades 
komplekti täiendava mehhanismi, muutub komplekti tervikmõju. Näiteks, juha-
tuse oportunistliku käitumise piiramiseks ei pruugi piisata eraldiseisvalt nõukogu 
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kontrollfunktsioonist või omanikega huve ühildavast motivatsioonisüsteemist, 
kuid nende kahe mehhanismi koosmõju võib olla piisav nimetatud probleemi 
lahendamiseks (Ward, 2009). Asendatavus tähendab, et mehhanismid lahen-
davad sisuliselt sama ülesannet ning seetõttu võib ühe teise vastu vahetada, ilma 
et komplekti tervikfunktsionaalsus oluliselt muutuks. Näiteks, nõukogu kontroll-
funktsiooni võib asendada suuromaniku kontrollfunktsiooniga (Rediker & Seth, 
1995). Tulenevalt komplementaarsuse ja asendatavuse printsiipidest on võimalik 
luua erinevaid mehhanismide komplekte lisades või eemaldades erinevaid sisemisi 
mehhanisme.  
Komplekti lisatavate sisemiste mehhanismide valikut mõjutab ettevõtte kon-
tekst. Esiteks, ettevõtte tegevuspiikonnas kehtivad välised mehhanismid võimal-
davad või piiravad mingite sisemiste mehhanismide rakendamist. Teiseks mõju-
tavad valikut ettevõtte enda karakteristikud, näiteks ettevõtte suurus või elutsükli 
faas (Huse, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & Allcock, 2010). Ettevõtted 
erinevates kontekstides vajavad edukaks toimimiseks erinevaid mehhanismide 
komplekte (Heracleous, 2001; Huse, 2005; García-Castro et al., 2013). 
Mehhanismide valikut mõjutab ka mehhanismidega seotud kulu. Mehha-
nismide kulu võib olla otsene – näiteks juhatuse või nõukogu tasud – või kaudne 
alternatiivkulu – näiteks aeg, mille juhatus kulutab investorsuhetele, on kadunud 
ettevõtte sisulise juhtimise jaoks (Aguilera et al. 2008). Seega, kuigi põhi-
mõtteliselt võib mehhanismide komplekti lisada palju eri mehhanisme, et maksi-
meerida komplementaarsuse efekti, võivad seotud kulud jõuda tasemele, kus 
need hakkavad ületama saadud kasu (García-Castro et al., 2013).  
 
 
Väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemise eripärad 
Väikeste eraettevõtete analüüsil tuleb arvestada kahe kontekstifaktoriga: 1) ette-
võtted ei ole börsil noteeritud, ja 2) nad on väikese või keskmise suurusega. 
Järgnevalt on toodud peamised väikeste eraettevõtete eripärad ja nende mõju 
ettevõtte valitsemisele. 
Eraettevõtte aktsiad ei ole börsil noteeritud, mistõttu üldjuhul erinevad 
eraettevõtte omanikkonna koosseis, ootused ja rollid börsil noteeritud ettevõtte 
vastavatest kriteeriumitest. Eraettevõtte omanikud on tavaliselt rohkem seotud 
konkreetse ettevõttega ja nende majanduslik olukord sõltub selle konkreetse 
ettevõtte tulemuslikkusest (Ciampi, 2015). Börsiettevõtete omanikud seevastu 
omavad tüüpiliselt väga väikest osalust börsiettevõttes ning nende portfellis on 
tavaliselt mitmeid börsiettevõtteid, mistõttu nende majanduslik olukord ei sõltu 
nii väga iga üksiku ettevõtte tulemustest. Kuna börsiettevõtete aktsiad on vabalt 
kaubeldavad, on selle omanikel mitterahuldavate tulemuste korral suhteliselt 
lihtne oma osalus müüa ja osta mõne teise börsiettevõtte aktsiaid (Connelly et al., 
2010). Eraettevõtte omanikel on osaluse müük oluliselt keerukam, mistõttu on 
neil motivatsioon, et kontrollida ning suunata ettevõtte käekäiku (Denis & 
McConnell, 2003).  
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Eraettevõtte omanikud omavad ettevõttes tavaliselt suhteliselt suurt osalust 
(La Porta, 1999) võrreldes tüüpiliste börsiettevõtte omanikega, mistõttu võimu-
suhted omanike ja juhatuse vahel erinevad oluliselt. Eraettevõtte (suur)omanikel 
on lihtsam teha soovi korral või ebarahuldavate tulemuste puhul juhatuses muutusi, 
et uus juhtkond viiks ettevõtet edasi omanike soovitud suunas. Börsiettevõtete 
juhid on tavaliselt omanike surve all, et saavutada häid lühiajalisi tulemusi, samas 
kui eraettevõtete omanikud on tüüpiliselt huvitatud tulemustest pikemas aja-
horisondis (Huse, 2005).  
Eraettevõtete omanikud on tihti ise ka juhatuse liikmed (Huse, 2005; Brunninge 
et al., 2007). Sellest tulenevalt on omanike ja juhatuse vaheline agendiprobleem 
eraettevõtete puhul tavaliselt vähem oluline kui börsiettevõtete puhul, kus oma-
nike ja juhatuse vahel on üldjuhul selgem eristus (Uhlaner et al., 2007; Machold 
et al., 2011). Samas võib mitme omanikuga eraettevõtete puhul olla oluliseks 
küsimuseks võimalik konflikt enamus- ja vähemusomanike vahel (Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; Roe, 2004). 
Väikestel ettevõtetel on vähemate ressursside tõttu keeruline palgata suure-
liikmelist juhatust, kes formuleeriks ja viiks ellu ettevõtte strateegia. Kuna väikeste 
ettevõtete juhatused on tavaliselt väiksemad, on seda olulisem, et juhatuses oleks 
sobivad inimesed just selle ettevõtte jaoks (Cowling, 2003). Igast ühest juhatuse 
liikmest sõltub väikeses juhatuses rohkem kui suurearvulises juhatuses. See 
tähendab väikeste ettevõtete omanike jaoks, et sobiva juhatuse valimine, moti-
veerimine ja vajadusel väljavahetamine on olulised mehhanismid ettevõtte 
valitsemiseks.  
Üks tavaliselt vähe kasutatud ettevõtete valitsemise mehhanism väikeste ette-
võtete jaoks on nõukogu, eriti tema juhatust toetavas rollis (Van den Heuvel 
et al., 2006; Machold et al., 2011). Nõukogu liikmed saaksid ettevõttele näiteks 
pakkuda täiendavaid spetsiifilisi teadmisi, nõustada strateegia vallas või esindada 
ettevõtte huve väliste huvigruppide juures. Arvestades, et väikeste ettevõtete juha-
tused on väiksearvulised, on selline tugi väikeste ettevõtete jaoks olulisem kui 
suurettevõtete jaoks (Huse, 2005). Paraku tegelikkuses piirdub väikeste ette-
võtete nõukogude roll pigem seaduses nõutud formaalsete toimingutega (ibid.) 
ning võimalik lisaväärtus nõukogu olemasolust jääb piiratuks (Brunninge & 
Nordqvist, 2004). 
Väikeste ettevõtete ressursside vähesuse tõttu on ettevõtte valitsemise mehha-
nismide kuluaspekt oluline piirav faktor. Mõned kulukad mehhanismid, näiteks 
mahukad kontroll- või raporteerimissüsteemid, mis on suurte ettevõtete puhul 




Tänapäevane ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse käsitlus on kompleksne ja mitmetahuline 
valdkond (Dess & Robinson, 1984; Rauch et al., 2009; Richard et al., 2009), mis 
hõlmab tulemuslikkust finantsilises, operatiivses (mittefinantsilises) ja huvi-
gruppide eesmärkide saavutamise vaates (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). 
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Finantsnäidikud, näiteks käibe kasv või kasumlikkus, käsitlevad kitsalt ettevõtte 
majanduslikke eesmärke. Operatiivse tulemuslikkuse tase lisab mittefinantsilised 
mõõdikud, näiteks uute toodete lisamine tooteportfelli, uutele turgudele sisene-
mine, kvaliteedi näitajad ja klientide rahulolu. Huvigruppide eesmärkide saavuta-
mise dimensioon hõlmab eri huvigruppide, näiteks enamus- ja vähemusomanikud, 
töötajad, partnerid ja ühiskond, erinevate ning potentsiaalselt vastandlike ootuste 




Lähtudes doktoritöö eesmärgist ja tuginedes eeltoodud kirjanduse ülevaatele on 
püstitatud järgmised kolm uurimisküsimust (K1-K3), mis analüüsivad väikeste 
ettevõtete valitsemise seoseid tulemuslikkuse eri dimensioonidega (Joonis 2). 
 
Joonis 2. Raamistik uurimaks ettevõtete valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse seoseid. Autori 
koostatud. 
K1: Kuidas luua väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemise mehhanismide komplekt, mis toetaks 
nii omanike finantseesmärkide kui ka teiste huvigruppide eesmärkide saavutamist? 
K2: Kas väikeste eraettevõtete juhatuse karakteristikute ja finantstulemuslikkuse vahel 
on seos? 
K3: Kas väikeste eraettevõtete puhul on uue juhatuse liikme määramise ja sellele järgneva 






























Töö tulemuste kokkuvõte 
Töö tulemused on allpool esitatud uurimisküsimuste kaupa. 
K1: Kuidas luua väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemise mehhanismide komplekt, mis 
toetaks nii omanike finantseesmärkide kui ka teiste huvigruppide eesmärkide 
saavutamist? 
Uurimistöö raames viidi läbi kaasusanalüüs erakapitalifondis BaltCap ning uuriti, 
kuidas loob BaltCap ettevõtete valitsemise mehhanismi komplekti oma portfelli 
kuuluvatele ettevõtetele: millised mehhanismid ja miks sinna valitakse? Kuna 
BaltCap on professionaalne väikeste eraettevõtete omanik, on nende kogemused 
ja teadmised väärtuslikud nii akadeemilises kui praktilises vaates. 
Selgus, et BaltCap lähtub kõigi oma portfelliettevõtete puhul sarnasest loogi-
kast, kuigi detailides võib olla erisusi. Joonis 3 võtab lühidalt kokku erinevate 
osapoolte tegevused mehhanismide komplekti loomisel. Peamiste märksõnadena 
võib välja tuua aktiivse omaniku põhimõtte, mis ei tähenda, et omanik osaleb 
tingimata ettevõtte igapäevases juhtimises, aga pigem suunab ja kontrollib ette-
võtet nõukogu töö raames. Omanik osaleb aktiivselt ettevõtte pikaajaliste ees-
märkide ning tööpõhimõtete määratlemisel ning juhatuse toetamisel nõukogu 
erinevates rollides. 
Joonis 3. Väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemise mehhanismide komplekti koostamise põhi-






Osapooled Tegevused Mehhanismid 
Pikaajaliste eesmärkide määratlemine
Väärtuste ja põhimõtete määratlemine Eetikakoodeks 
Kompetentse nõukogu loomine
Kompetentse juhtimise korraldamine Juhatuse liikmete määramine 
Juhatuse eesmärgistamine Juhatuse mõõdikud 
Juhatuse motiveerimine Juhatuse motivatsioonisüsteem 
Juhatuse kontrollimine Nõukogu kontrolli roll 
Juhatuse nõustamine Nõukogu nõuandev roll 
Välistele ressurssidele ligipääsu tagamine Nõukogu ressursside hankija roll 
Aktsionäride leping 
Mehhanismi fookus 
Väärtuse kaitsmine Väärtuse loomine
121 
K2: Kas väikeste eraettevõtete juhatuse karakteristikute ja finantstulemuslikkuse 
vahel on seos? 
Uurimistöö raames analüüsiti logistilise regressiooni meetodil seoseid erinevate 
juhatuse liikmete karakteristikute ning finantstulemuslikkuse vahel. Tabel 2 
esitleb analüüsitud sõltumatute muutujate lõikes saavutatud tulemused: kas 
tuvastati statistiliselt oluline positiivne või negatiivne seos, või ei olnud seos 
statistiliselt oluline. Tulemused on esitatud üldkogumi kohta ning täiendava ana-
lüüsina jagatuna suuruse ning vanuse järgi gruppidesse. Kokkuvõtlikult võib 
analüüsist järeldada, et mõnede analüüsitud karakteristikute puhul on tuvastatud 
statistiliselt oluline seos muutuja ning finantstulemuslikkuse vahel. Üldkogumi 
puhul tuvastati, et finantstulemuslikkusega oli negatiivne seos juhatuse suurusel 
ning mitme eri ettevõtte juhatuses osalemisel. Positiivne seos tuvastati juhatuse 
liikmete vanuse ning omanike ja juhatuse kattuvuse ning finantstulemuslikkuse 
vahel. Juhatuse liikmete soolise heterogeensuse, juhatuse liikmete juhatuses oldud 
aja ja omanike kontsentratsiooni puhul oli seos finantstulemuslikkusega statisti-
liselt ebaoluline. 
 
Tabel 2. Seosed juhatuse karakteristikute ja finantstulemuslikkuse vahel.  
Muutuja Üldine 
tulemus 









Juhatuse suurus Negatiivne Negatiivne Ebaoluline Negatiivne Ebaoluline 
Juhatuse sooline 
heterogeensus 
Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline 
Juhatuse liikmete 
vanus 
Positiivne Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline 
Mitmes juhatuses 
osalemine 
Negatiivne Negatiivne Negatiivne Negatiivne Ebaoluline 
Juhatuse liikmete 
kogemus 
Ebaoluline Positiivne Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline 
Omanike 
kontsentratsioon 
Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline Ebaoluline 
Omanike ja 
juhatuse kattuvus 
Positiivne Positiivne Positiivne Positiivne Positiivne 
Allikas: Autori koostatud. Tabeli koostamisel on lähtutud p-väärtuse olulisuse nivoost p<0.01. 
 
 
                                                                          
8  Ettevõtted grupis “suuremad ettevõtted” vastavad jätkuvalt väikeste ja keskmise suurusega 
ettevõtte kriteeriumitele. 
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K3: Kas väikeste eraettevõtete puhul on uue juhatuse liikme määramise ja sellele 
järgneva ettevõtte uutele turgudele või uutesse tegevusvaldkondadesse laiene-
mise vahel seos? 
Doktoritöö raames analüüsiti logistilise regressiooni meetodil seoseid uue juha-
tuse liikme määramise (sõltumatu muutuja) ning sellele sündmusele järgneva eri 
tüüpi strateegiliste muutuste (sõltuvad muutujad) vahel. Strateegilisteks muutus-
teks olid ettevõtte laienemine uude tegevusvaldkonda, ekspordi alustamine või 
juba eksportivate ettevõtete puhul täiendavatele eksporditurgudele sisenemine. 
Analüüs tuvastas seoseid uue juhatuse liikme määramise ning osade nimetatud 
strateegiliste muutuste vahel, kuigi seoste tugevus varieerus. Statistiliselt kõige 
tugevam seos leiti uue juhatuse liikme määramise ja sellele järgneva ekspordiga 
alustamise vahel. Statistiliselt oluline seos oli ka uue juhatuse liikme määramise 
ja uutesse tegevusvaldkondadesse laienemise vahel, kuigi seos oli statistiliselt 
nõrgem kui ekspordiga alustamise puhul. Täiendavatele eksporditurgudele 
laienemise puhul oli seos statistiliselt ebaoluline. 
 
 
Doktoritöö teoreetiline panus 
Doktoritöö panus teoreetilisse kirjandusse on kokkuvõtlikult järgmine: 
1. Doktoritöö panustab ettevõtete valitsemise kirjandusse uurides väikeste ja 
keskmise suurusega eraettevõtete valitsemist. Nimetatud segment on võrrel-
des suurte börsiettevõtete segmendiga vähe uuritud (Uhlaner et al., 2007, Li 
et al., 2020).  
2. Doktoritöö keskendub suhteliselt vähem uuritud Kontinentaal-Euroopa 
taustsüsteemis tegutsevatele ettevõtetele ja panustab sellega võrdlevasse 
ettevõtete valitsemise kirjandusse (e.g. Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Schiell et 
al., 2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014; Hooghiemstra et al., 2015; Clarke, 2016). 
3. Doktoritöö analüüsib ettevõtete valitsemise ja vastutustundliku ettevõtluse 
kokkupuutepunkte, mis on suhteliselt vähe uuritud valdkond (Jain & Jamali, 
2016), eriti väikeste eraettevõtete segmendis (e.g. Estapé-Dubreuil et al., 
2016; Jamali et al., 2017; Amos, 2018; López-Pérez et al., 2018). 
4. Doktoritöö panustab kirjandusse analüüsides kuidas ettevõtteid valitseda pro-
fessionaalsete eraettevõtete omanike tervikliku ettevõtte valitsemise mehha-
nismide komplekti näitel. Kui valdavalt keskenduvad ettevõtte valitsemisega 
seotud analüüsid erinevate karakteristikute kvantitatiivsetele analüüsidele, siis 
uuringuid, mis keskenduksid ettevõtete valitsemise protsessidele ja osapoolte 
rollidele, on vähe (Li et al., 2020). 
5. Doktoritöö panustab ettevõtete valitsemise ja ebaõnnestumiste kirjandusse 
analüüsides vähe uuritud väikeste ja keskmise suurusega eraettevõtete seg-
menti (Ciampi, 2015; 2017). 
6. Doktoritöö panustab ettevõtete valitsemise ja strateegiliste muutuste kir-
jandusse uurides, kuidas on seotud muutused väikeste ja keskmise suurusega 
eraettevõtete valitsemises ja ettevõtete strateegilised muutused.  
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7. Doktoritöö näitab, et väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemise puhul ei ole agendi-
teooria peamise alusteooriana optimaalne ega piisav, vaid tuleks tugineda 
täiendavatele teooriatele nagu näiteks ressursisõltuvuse teooria ja ressursi-
põhine teooria. Doktoritöö toetab seega järeldusi, mida on teinud ka mitmed 
teised uurijad, näiteks Uhlaner et al. (2007), Aguilera et al. (2008), Huse et al. 
(2011) ja Li et al. (2020). 
 
 
Töö praktiline tähtsus 
Lisaks teoreetilisele panusele omab doktoritöö ka praktilist tähtsust. 
1. Doktoritöö esitleb professionaalsete väikeste eraettevõtete omanike poolt 
loodud ettevõtte valitsemise mehhanismide komplekti, mis võib sobida 
aluseks ka teistele väikeste eraettevõtete omanikele. Komplekti nüansse võib 
olla vajalik kohandada vastavalt iga ettevõtte kontekstile, kuid selle üldine 
raamistik ja loogika on asjakohane. 
2. Doktoritöö näitab aktiivse omaniku rolli tähtsust. Aktiivne omanik ei pea 
tingimata osalema ettevõtte igapäevases juhtimises, aga võib väljenduda ka 
osalemises eesmärkide seadmises ja strateegia koostamises ning juhtkonna 
toetamises eesmärkide saavutamisel.  
3. Ühe aktiivse omaniku rolli näitena analüüsib doktoritöö, kuidas omanik saab 
muuta ettevõtte kurssi tehes muutusi juhatuse koosseisus. 
4. Doktoritöö näitab nõukogu erinevaid rolle ja nende tähtsust ettevõtte valitse-
mises ning väärtuse loomises. Nõukogu on suhteliselt alakasutatud ressurss 
väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemises, kuid tal on potentsiaali luua märksa suure-
mat väärtust. 
5. Doktoritöö analüüsib ettevõtete tulemuslikkuse mõõtmise mitmedimensio-
naalsust, näitab eri dimensioonide tähtsust, omadusi ning seoseid eri dimen-
sioonide vahel. Omanike, nõukogu ja juhatuse liikmete teadlikkus neist aspek-
tidest on oluline ettevõtete tegevuse eesmärgistamisel ning ettevõtte valitsemise 
mehhanismide komplekti koostamisel. 
6. Doktoritöö näitab varasema ekspordi kogemuse olulisust eksporti alustavate 
väikeste eraettevõtete puhul. Teadlikkus sellest asjaolust on oluline nii ette-
võtete omanikele juhatuse liikmete värbamisel, aga ka poliitikakujundatel 
näiteks eksporti toetavate poliitikameetmete kujundamisel. 
 
 
Piirangud ja soovitused edasisteks uuringuteks 
Tulenevalt uurimismetoodikas tehtud valikutest kehtivad doktoritööle mõned 
olulised piirangud, millega tuleks tulemuste tõlgendamise arvestada. 
Esiteks, kuna ettevõtete valitsemise temaatika on väga lai ning nüansirohke, 
siis ei ole töös mahupiirangute tõttu detailselt käsitletud kõiki võimalikke ette-
võtte valitsemise mehhanisme ning nende mõju tulemuslikkusele. Töö kvanti-
tatiivsed analüüsid käsitlevad juhatuse liikmete karakteristikute seoseid finants-
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tulemuslikkusega ja juhatuse koosseisus tehtavate muutuste seoseid operatiiv-
tulemuslikkusega. Muid mehhanisme ei ole käsitletud võrreldava detailsusega. 
Teiseks, doktoritöö käsitleb väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemist Kontinentaal-
Euroopa taustsüsteemis ja teeb seda Eesti ettevõtete näitel. Kuigi üldised institut-
sionaalsed mõjud Kontinentaal-Euroopa süsteemi kuuluvatel riikidel on sarnased, 
siis detailides (näiteks seadusandlikud nüansid vms.) võib olla erinevusi, millega 
tuleb arvestada kandes Eesti ettevõtete näitel leitud tulemusi üle teiste Konti-
nentaal-Euroopa riikide ettevõtetele. 
Väikeste eraettevõtete valitsemise edasiseks uurimiseks on mitmeid võima-
lusi. Näiteks tasuks uurida muude valitsemise mehhanismide seoseid ettevõtete 
tulemuslikkusega. Lisaks võiksid tulevased uuringud püüda analüüsida põhjus-
likke seoseid ettevõtete valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse muutujate vahel. Käesoleva 
doktoritööga sarnaseid uuringuid tasuks teha ka muudes Kontinentaal-Euroopa 
süsteemi kuuluvates riikides, et tuvastada ja analüüsida võimalikke erisusi. Samuti 
tasub uurida samu teemasid muudes institutsionaalsetes süsteemides, nt Anglo-
Ameerika mudel, kus erinevused väliste mehhanismide vahel on suuremad, mis-
tõttu võib eeldada, et ka sisemised mehhanismid erinevad olulisemalt võrreldes 
käesolevas doktoritöös leituga. 
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